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ABSTRACT 
Over the last ten years, performance-based equity pay, and particularly 
performance shares, has displaced stock options as the primary instrument for 
compensating executives of large, public companies in the U.S.  This article 
examines that transformation, analyzing the structure and incentive properties of 
these newly important instruments and evaluating the benefits and risks from an 
investor’s perspective.  Notable observations include the following:  Although 
technically “stock” instruments, performance shares mimic the incentive 
characteristics of options.  But performance shares avoid the tax, accounting, and 
other constraints that have led to uniform grants of non-indexed, at-the-money 
options.  Performance share plans can be designed to be effectively in, at, or out 
of the money and these plans often employ relative performance measurement 
that makes them analogous to rarely observed indexed stock options.  But the 
opacity of performance share plans creates risks for investors, and the two 
accounting approaches applicable to these instruments both result in systematic 
undervaluation for executive pay disclosure and financial reporting purposes.  
Given the growing dominance of these instruments, this article advocates the 
adoption of a mark-to-market accounting regime for all equity compensation. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  
Acknowledgments to follow.   
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Introduction 
  “Stock options are on the verge of extinction.”  Wall Street Journal, 8/26/13.1 
Are executive stock options on the verge of extinction?  A cursory look at the data would 
suggest that many large public companies have abandoned conventional stock options in favor of 
restricted stock.  At the peak of the stock option boom in 2000, options accounted for over 60% 
of the total value of compensation awarded to the top executives of a sample of 350 S&P 500 
companies, while restricted stock grants contributed about 10%.2  In 2013, options accounted for 
only 17% of senior executive pay at S&P 500 companies, while stock grants contributed 42%.3 
Such a fundamental shift in the composition of equity pay in just a little over a decade 
would seem to have profound implications for executives, shareholders, and their companies.  
One commentator has suggested that the shift means more certain returns for executives and 
simpler compensation, but also the loss of a powerful executive wealth generator and incentive 
device.4  But it isn’t clear that any of this is true.  First, options remain popular with start-up 
firms, particularly tech companies.5  But even at S&P 500 firms, there is both more and less than 
meets the eye in the switch from options to stock.  Stock options have not been replaced with 
traditional restricted stock – stock that “vests” or becomes owned outright with the simple 
passage of time.  Instead, the void has been filled by performance-vested stock, performance 
shares, and similar “stock” instruments.6  A participant in a typical performance share plan 
receives a variable number of shares after, say, three years, depending on firm performance 
along any number of accounting or share-value metrics.  Under these plans, stronger firm 
performance generally means both more shares and more valuable shares, producing a multiplier 
effect that resembles the economics of a stock option.7  So, while conventional options may be 
on the way out, option-like leverage remains vibrant. 
But this shift isn’t just an example of old wine in new bottles.  There are significant 
differences between traditional stock options and performance-based stock that have important 
implications for participants, shareholders, and regulators.  On the positive side, performance 
share and performance-vested stock plans often employ relative performance metrics.8  The 
number of shares awarded is a function of a company’s stock returns, earnings, or revenue 
relative to the returns, earnings, or revenue at a peer group of companies.  As a result, these 
                                                 
1 Emily Chasan, Last Gasp for Stock Options?, CFO Journal Blog, The Wall Street Journal. 
2 David I. Walker, Evolving Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 611, 
633 (2011) (reporting data based on grant date valuation). 
3 Author’s calculation based on ExecuComp data. 
4 Chasan, supra note x. 
5 Pui-Wing Tam, Stock Options Still Popular with Tech Firms, The Valley, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 4, 2010, at 
A13C. 
6 Infra. 
7 Infra. 
8 Infra. 
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instruments are much more responsive to firm-specific performance, answering the long-
standing objection that traditional options were simply “pay for pulse” that rewarded executives 
for general market rises.9  In fact, the economics of these instruments closely resembles that of 
indexed stock options10 – a semi-mythical pay device that has been touted for years as the answer 
to the pay for pulse problem but was rarely adopted, perhaps because of accounting and tax 
constraints.  Performance-based stock designs avoid those constraints.11 
But from a shareholder advocacy perspective, there are downsides to performance-based 
stock plans as well.  Many of these plans are highly complex.  Some involve multiple 
performance metrics.12  It may be relatively simple to determine the number of shares that should 
be awarded at the end of the performance period, but it is very difficult to gauge the value 
transferred from company to executive at the time of grant.  The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), the accounting standard setter, thinks that we currently lack the technology to 
determine the ex ante value of many of these instruments.13  Given that, how are conscientious 
directors supposed to gauge the trade-offs between performance shares and options, and between 
the various potential performance metrics?  Moreover, unlike traditional stock options, which 
tend to follow a one size fits all design, there is great variation in performance share plan metrics 
and design.  While increased customization may be efficiency enhancing, it makes it more 
difficult for directors, shareholders, and even executives to compare plans from firm to firm.  A 
cynic might suspect that the shift to performance shares is just one more example of boards and 
executives working together to obfuscate executive pay awards in order to lessen outrage over 
the ever-increasing amounts transferred to senior management. 
In addition, performance-based stock plans are both less and more “gameable” than 
options.  These plans universally gauge performance over a pre-determined period.  Unlike 
options, they do not allow participants to time exercise to their advantage.14  That’s an 
improvement.  But complex performance metrics are gameable in the choice of peer group, when 
relative performance metrics are employed, and in the particular metrics selected, e.g., earnings, 
sales, cash flow, or shareholder return.  The chosen metric may perfectly align executive 
incentives with firm objectives, or the choice might reflect executives’ private forecasts based on 
inside information.15   
                                                 
9 E.g., Sudhakar V. Balachandran, Paying for a Pulse, Forbes.com, 10/15/2008.  Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO 
Pay More Tightly to Performance; Options Grants May Depend On Meeting Financial Goals; Moving Beyond a 
'Pulse', Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1. 
10 Unlike traditional employee stock options that have a fixed strike or exercise price, the strike price of an indexed 
option is adjusted up or down based on increases or decreases in an index, such as the S&P 500 stock price index.  
See infra. 
11 Infra. 
12 Infra. 
13 Infra. 
14 Infra. 
15 Infra. 
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Making matters worse, two different accounting regimes apply to performance-based 
stock instruments depending on the specific metrics employed, both of which are favorable from 
the firm/executive perspective in that they tend to reduce reported compensation expense and 
increase earnings, although the mechanisms differ.16  One method, which applies to share price 
or market-based performance hurdles, requires the use of complex models to estimate a grant 
date fair value, providing firms with significant discretion to select assumptions that will 
minimize reported compensation.  The other method, applicable to accounting-based 
performance measures, results in a structural downward bias with respect to the expected 
expense amount and also provides discretion to under-report executive pay as of the grant date.   
Moreover, both methods are used when both types of performance measures are employed with 
respect to a single pay award, multiplying the opportunity to under-report executive pay.  
Although these plans are relatively new, firms are increasingly adopting multiple metrics.  
We’ve seen this film before.  Just as the highly favorable option accounting rules of the 1990s 
contributed to that boom, favorable accounting for certain performance share plans already 
appears to be skewing firm choices in this new era.17   
Can these drawbacks be addressed while preserving the relative performance 
measurement benefits of performance-based stock?  Perhaps.  Our experience with options may 
provide a useful model.  It took many years to develop financial reporting rules that leveled the 
playing field between various equity instruments and disclosure requirements that would allow 
investors to evaluate and confirm the company-reported valuation of option grants.  
Unfortunately, the level playing field for equity pay accounting lasted less than a decade.18  At a 
minimum, the rules need to be revised to eliminate the discrepancies between various new equity 
pay instruments.  More fundamentally, it may be time to stop relying on ex ante valuation of 
equity pay for accounting purposes and adopt a mark-to-market approach in determining the 
annual expense to be associated with all of these instruments.  This step would not prevent 
opportunistic mis-valuation of these instruments, but it would reduce the incentive to engage in 
that behavior. 
In addition, much more disclosure of the assumptions used in valuing new equity grants 
is required.  Going further, we might also require disclosure of all of the details and results of the 
simulations used to value these instruments.  Peer group choice must be fully justified and 
broader groups (e.g., the S&P 500) might be preferred or mandated to reduce gaming.  Firms 
should be required to justify performance metrics and, in particular, changes in performance 
metrics, which might be opportunistic.19   
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  Part I provides a primer on the law 
and economics of equity compensation, focusing on the incentive-generating properties of 
                                                 
16 Infra. 
17 Infra. 
18 Infra. 
19 Infra. 
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conventional stock and option grants, relative performance evaluation, and tax and accounting 
constraints.  Part II describes and offers potential explanations for the dramatic shift in executive 
pay practices over the last decade.  Part III analyzes performance-based equity pay, focusing on 
the now-dominant performance-based stock category, dissecting examples of the most 
commonly encountered variants, and relating these to conventional equity pay instruments.  
Although performance-based stock plans now account for the largest single slice of aggregate 
senior executive pay at S&P 500 firms, performance-based option grants and long-term cash-
based performance plans are observed as well, and are briefly considered.  Part IV provides an 
assessment, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of performance-based stock as an 
executive pay instrument.  Particular attention is paid in this Part to disparities in accounting and 
disclosure rules that already appear to be influencing compensation design and to a proposed 
solution – mark-to-market accounting for all equity compensation.    
I.  A Primer on the Law and Economics of Executive Equity Compensation 
This Part sets the stage for our consideration of performance-based stock compensation 
by reviewing the terms and economics of conventional stock and option pay, as well as the tax 
and accounting rules that play such an important role in executive pay design.   
Equity-based compensation has dominated the pay packages of senior corporate 
executives since the mid-1990s.20  A principal reason firms use equity pay is to create incentives 
that will mitigate managerial agency costs.  Agency costs arise from the separation of ownership 
and control that characterizes large, public corporations.21  These costs reflect the divergence 
between managerial actions and decisions that would maximize shareholder value and actual 
actions and decisions, plus monitoring and other costs undertaken to minimize that divergence.22  
These agency costs are not totally avoidable, but they can be reduced by designing compensation 
to better align executives’ economic interests with shareholder interests.  Long-term, equity-
based compensation plays a clear role in that effort.23 
Conventional stock options, and to a lesser extent restricted stock, reigned supreme 
during the early years of the equity pay era.  These stock and option instruments were highly 
uniform.  Options almost always provided the holder with the right to purchase shares at a future 
date by paying an amount equal to the market price of the stock on the date of grant, an 
instrument known as an at-the-money option.24  Restricted stock was even simpler.  Classically, 
                                                 
20 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
21 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
22 Id. 
23 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
24 Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds, Handbook of Labor 
Economics 2458 (1999).  Typically, these options would first become exercisable, or “vest”, within three or four 
years of grant and would be exercisable at the discretion of the holder for up to ten years following grant.  These 
options were not transferable. 
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a firm would award a tranche of shares to an executive on a given date.  The shares would be 
subject to forfeiture if employment terminated before the shares vested and became owned 
outright.  That vesting might occur on one date in the future or a fraction might vest annually for 
a number of years.  Over time, the award of restricted stock units has largely supplanted actual 
grants of restricted stock.25   Instead of issuing stock at grant, firms issuing restricted stock units 
promise to deliver stock when the shares vest.  Although there may be differences in the 
treatment of dividends and voting rights,26 restricted stock and restricted stock units are 
essentially identical economically, and the term “restricted stock” will be used to refer to both.27 
Both stock and options tie pay to stock price performance.  Stock does so in a linear 
fashion.  Assuming that the shares ultimately vest, a dollar increase in share price translates into 
an additional dollar of wealth for the holder of a restricted share.28   
The intrinsic value of an option – the value that would be realized if the option were 
exercised immediately – follows the “hockey stick” pattern displayed in the figure below.  As 
long as the stock price is less than the exercise price, the option has zero intrinsic value.  To the 
extent that the stock price exceeds the strike price, the option has positive intrinsic value equal to 
the difference.  But prior to expiration, an option’s total value exceeds its intrinsic value because 
the stock price may rise, increasing the payout on the option.  The full value of an unexercised 
option also increases and decreases with increases and decreases in the share price, but the 
relationship is not linear, it is convex.29  An option that is far out of the money, i.e., with strike 
price far in excess of the current value of the underlying shares, has a low value and a value that 
is relatively insensitive to the value of the underlying shares.  The value of an option that is far in 
the money, i.e., with strike price far below the current value of the underlying shares, approaches 
the current share price less the exercise price, and that value moves dollar for dollar with small 
changes in the underlying share price. The relationship is plotted in the figure below.30 
 
                                                 
25 Hay Group, the Executive Edition, Sept. 2013.     
26 Hay Group, the Executive Edition, Sept. 2013. 
27 Another difference is that IRC section 83(b) elections can be made for restricted stock grants but not for grants of 
restricted stock units (RSUs).  An 83(b) election results in taxation of the recipient based on the grant date value of 
the award rather than the realized value on vesting.  But there are significant downsides to 83(b) elections and they 
are rarely observed in the public company context, so this difference is of little real consequence.  Myron S. Scholes 
et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach 221 (5th ed. 2014). See Robert L. McDonald, Is It 
Optimal to Accelerate the Payment of Incomes Tax on Share-Based Compensation? Section 2.3 (Working Paper, 
Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/mcdonald/htm/opexer.pdf. 
28 Walker, supra (Vandy).  
29 Walker, supra (Vandy).  When graphed, a convex relationship presents a U-shaped curve. The relationship 
between option value and the price of the underlying shares tracks the right half of the U. 
30 In the figure, the asset “spot” price refers to the current market price of the stock. 
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Economists use the term “delta” to describe the change in the value of an instrument 
arising from a small change in the underlying share price.  Restricted stock has a delta equal to 
1.0.  Options have a delta of less than 1.0.31  Per share, options provide less of an incentive to 
increase the share price than does stock.  However, options are also cheaper to grant than stock.  
Remember that conventional restricted stock vests with the simple passage of time.  As long as 
an executive remains employed, she is certain to receive something of value – more or less value 
depending on the share price – but something of value nonetheless.  Not so with an option.  The 
option may expire unexercised out of the money.  Thus, the expected cost of providing an option 
is much less than that of issuing stock.  When these two effects are combined, it turns out that 
per dollar of compensation expense, options produce stronger incentives than restricted stock – 
more delta per dollar.32 
In addition to increasing the sensitivity of pay to share price performance, replacing stock 
compensation with equally valuable option compensation increases the sensitivity of pay to the 
volatility of share prices.  Economists use the term “vega” to denote the sensitivity of option 
value to volatility.33  The value of shares is not directly affected by changes in volatility, and thus 
restricted stock has vega of zero.  The value of an option, on the other hand, increases with 
increasing volatility of the underlying share price.  Options have positive vega.  Thus, adding 
options to a compensation package tends to increase an executive’s appetite for volatility, which 
means increasing the appetite for taking on risky projects.  If one believes that executives tend to 
                                                 
31 An option that is far in the money and is almost certain to be exercised has a delta that approaches 1.0.  Options 
that are at the money or somewhat in or out of the money have a delta of less than 1.0.  See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, 
FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 251 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining the concept of the option delta). 
32 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
33 Hull, supra. 
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be excessively risk averse because they have so much of their financial and human capital tied up 
in their firms, option pay can mitigate this agency problem.34  This is the classic corporate 
finance story for the adoption of option-based pay.   
Although options are uniformly granted at the money, this is not inevitable; nor is it 
clearly optimal.  Pay packages provide compensation and incentives.  Directors want to provide 
high-powered incentives to encourage executives to work hard and to take on risky projects, but 
pay packages must be mutually acceptable, and executives – who cannot easily diversify – apply 
large discounts to very risky pay.  It is costly, in other words, for shareholders to impose high 
delta and high vega pay packages on executives.35   
Restricted stock, which in economic terms is an option with an exercise price of zero, is 
the safest form of conventional equity pay from the point of view of the executive.  At-the-
money options are generally risky.  In-the-money options with a positive exercise price fall in 
between stock and at-the-money options on this spectrum.  Out-of-the-money options are even 
riskier. 36  Ideally firms would select the “moneyness” of their equity pay packages to optimize 
compensation and incentives, to balance executive risk aversion against the value of creating 
high-powered incentives. 
Corporate finance researchers have studied the design of equity pay extensively and have 
concluded that the optimal arrangement ranges from far in-the-money options (i.e., restricted 
stock) to far out of the money options, depending on firm and executive characteristics.37  
However, many studies have concluded that within a certain range of assumptions, in-the-money 
options would be optimal.38  So why are conventional options uniformly granted at the money?  
Tax and accounting rules play a leading role, as will be discussed below.   
                                                 
34 See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 29 (2003) 
(explaining the risk aversion of under-diversified executives).  Shareholders, by comparison, are assumed to be 
diversified and risk neutral. 
35 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 
(2002) (explaining that “[r]estricting the trading and hedging activities of option recipients” causes executives 
receiving the options to “value the options below their cost to shareholders”); see also John E. Core et al., Executive 
Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 30 (noting that equity 
compensation is risky because stock prices are a noisy measure of firm performance and that recipients must be 
compensated for taking on the non-diversifiable risk). 
36 One way to think about this is to consider the odds of an option expiring out of the money.  Restricted stock 
cannot expire out of the money.  An option that is in the money at grant is less likely to expire out of the money than 
an option that is at the money at grant.  Etc. 
37 Compare Hall & Murphy, supra note x, at 26–27 (concluding that “when existing compensation is adjusted, 
incentives are maximized through restricted stock grants rather than options”) with Richard A. Lambert & David F. 
Larcker, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and Incentives 2 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=527822  (“exercise price in the optimal contract is frequently far 
‘out of the money’ “).  
38 See Yisong S. Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of Executive Stock Options, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 
1255, 1227 (2004) (“incentive-maximizing exercise price is typically greater than zero but less than the stock 
price”); Oded Palmon et al., Optimal Strike Prices of Stock Options for Effort-Averse Executives, 32 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 229, 230-31 (2008) (simulations suggest that options are optimally granted in the money); Yisong S. Tian, 
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Conventional options are uniformly granted with a fixed exercise price.  This is another 
initially puzzling uniformity since corporate finance theorists predict that firms would employ 
relative performance evaluation (RPE) to improve the efficiency of incentive contracts,39 and 
fixing the exercise price of an option foregoes an opportunity to introduce RPE into the scheme.  
Stock prices (and option values) rise and fall depending on the performance of a specific firm but 
also on the performance of the firm’s sector or the overall market.  Executives have no control 
over the overall market; little control over the performance of their peers; and the most control 
over the performance of their firm.  The idea behind RPE is to tie compensation as closely as 
possible to performance outcomes within the control of the executive and eliminate risks over 
which executives have no control.  In the case of stock options, RPE would be explicitly 
implemented by adjusting the exercise prices of options for increases or decreases in the average 
share price of a peer group of companies or of the overall market.  This is known as an indexed 
option.40  Since shareholders must compensate executives for taking on un-controllable risks, 
adopting more efficient, indexed option contracts should ultimately redound to the benefit of 
shareholders.41 
More prosaically, there are two obvious advantages to indexing stock options.  First, 
indexation eliminates the possibility of executive windfalls that arise when compensation 
consists of traditional options and the overall market rises, lifting all boats.  It is very hard to 
look at the stock market run up in the 1990s and not conclude that many executives holding 
options reaped unearned gains.  Second, indexation also mitigates the risk that a market 
downturn will unfairly penalize high-performing executives holding conventional options and 
that conventional options will move far out of the money in this scenario and cease providing 
effective incentives.   
Absent regulatory constraints, firms might attempt to design equity pay packages to 
minimize agency costs as suggested above.  I say might, because another school of thought 
posits that maximizing shareholder value is not the sole objective of this process.42  But even 
those who adhere strongly to the “optimal contracting” view of the executive pay setting process 
                                                                                                                                                             
Optimal Contracting, Incentive Effects and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options (Working Paper, Apr. 30, 
2001) at 32 (arguing that the optimal option design ranges from at the money to deep in the money, i.e., restricted 
stock, depending on degree of risk aversion). 
39 Bengt R. Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982). 
40 See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 101 
(Mar. – Apr. 1999). 
41 But see Ingolf Dittmann et al, Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts, 26 REV. FIN. STUDIES (2013) (arguing 
that indexation reduces option delta requiring firms to issue more indexed options to maintain incentives and that the 
tradeoff is generally suboptimal); Pierre Chaigneau et al, The Value of Informativeness for Contracting (working 
paper 2015) (showing that indexation reduces incentives). 
42 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (hereinafter BFW) (proposing a managerial power theory 
of the executive pay setting process). 
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recognize that tax and accounting rules strongly influence and sometimes limit what can be 
achieved.43 
It seems unlikely that the failure to index options was a result of obscurity.  The idea was 
repeatedly floated in the 1990s. Alfred Rappaport promoted the concept in a Harvard Business 
Review article in 1999.44  And a few firms, such as Level 3 Communications, experimented with 
indexed options and received significant attention in the press.45  But the idea never caught on.   
So, we have two puzzles.  Why are all options granted at the money and why didn’t firms 
index exercise prices?  Accounting and tax rules, I believe, figure prominently in the answer. 
Through 2005, U.S. accounting rules strongly favored the issuance of conventional, fixed 
exercise price, non-discounted (i.e., at- or out-of-the-money) options over other forms of equity 
pay, such as restricted stock.  A grant of restricted stock resulted in firms booking an expense 
over time for compensation cost equal to the market value of the stock at the time of grant, but 
no expense was recorded for fixed exercise price, non-discounted options at the time of grant, 
vesting, or exercise.46  These options were “free” from an accounting perspective.  (Indexed 
options, by contrast, were subject to a relatively onerous “mark-to-market” accounting regime 
under the pre-2006 accounting rules.47)  Kevin Murphy has argued that the popularity of 
conventional at-the-money options in the late 1990s and early 2000s reflected the mis-perceived 
cost of these options arising from their highly favorable accounting treatment.48 
In 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a new standard 
requiring firms to determine the grant date fair value of all equity compensation and to recognize 
this cost as an expense over the vesting period of the stock or option.49  This shift leveled the 
accounting playing field for stock and conventional options, and in all likelihood contributed to 
                                                 
43 E.g., Murphy, supra (1999) (suggesting stock option boom resulted from misperceived low cost of option pay 
resulting from former accounting regime). 
44 Rappaport, supra note x, at 101; see also Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A 
Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 31-50 (1997). 
45 E.g., Joann S. Lublin, Pay for Outperforming: James Crowe, Chief of Level 3 Communications, Makes the Case 
for Linking Stock Options to Market-Beating Gains, Wall St. J. R8 (Apr. 6, 2000) (reporting on Level 3 
Communication’s use of S&P 500 indexed options). 
46 See ACCT. PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (1972) [hereinafter 
APB 25].  Under APB 25, only the intrinsic value of an option – the degree to which an option was in the money – 
at the date of grant was recognized as an expense.   
47 See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION ¶ 66-67 (June 30, 
1993).  The pre-2006 rules also required performance shares, discussed in the next Part, to be marked to market. 
48 His argument is that managers and directors mis-perceived the cost of this form of compensation as a result of the 
artificially favorable accounting treatment.   Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How 
We Got There 80 (2012), available at (http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2041679) (“The accounting treatment of 
options promulgated the mistaken belief that options could be granted without any cost to the company. . . . 
Nonetheless, the idea that options were free (or at least cheap) was erroneously accepted in too many boardrooms”). 
49 See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123 (REVISED 2004) 
[henceforth SFAS 123R]. 
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the movement away from conventional options in the 2000s.  Now that they were no longer 
“free,” firms were less inclined to issue options.50 
Federal income tax rules have played at least a supporting role in this story.  Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) § 162(m), enacted in 1993, limits the deductibility of non-performance 
based compensation issued to certain senior executives to $1 million per year.  Although firms 
increasingly treat this $1 million "cap" as simply a consideration, and not a limitation on non-
performance based pay, the enactment of 162(m) likely contributed to the shift in favor of 
options in the early 1990s.  While conventional options easily qualify as performance-based pay, 
salary (and time-vested restricted stock) does not.51 
Today, a tax rule enacted in 2004 – IRC § 409A – essentially precludes the issuance of 
in-the-money or indexed exercise price options.  Under regular U.S. tax rules, compensation 
arising from a conventional, non-discounted option is not taxed until the option is exercised.52  
However, under § 409A, compensation arising from a discounted or indexed option would be 
taxed at vesting, rather than at exercise, and would be subjected to an additional 20% penalty 
tax.53 
Fixed exercise price, out-of-money options are feasible, but are rarely seen, presumably 
because recipients excessively discount these options.  Recipients would tend to focus 
excessively on their out-of-the-money-ness.54   Given § 409A and this behavioral effect, it is no 
surprise that 99+% of options are issued with a fixed exercise price that is at the money. 
Of course, it is also possible that the failure to index options is consistent with optimal 
contracting.  Despite the contracting advantages of RPE identified by Holmstrom, option 
indexation has been shown to reduce incentives, and it is possible that the tradeoff simply isn’t 
                                                 
50 Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There 97 (2012), available at 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2041679). 
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (providing that stock options will be deemed to be performance based if granted 
by the firm’s compensation committee in accordance with a plan meeting certain minimal requirements).  David 
Schizer concludes that while indexed options can qualify as performance based pay under IRC §162(m), the path to 
qualification is more cumbersome.  See David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on 
Managerial Agency Costs 10 (working paper, Sept. 19, 2014). 
52 I assume in this discussion that options are non-qualified options, i.e., not incentive stock options (ISOs) as 
defined in IRC 422.  The tax rules applicable to ISOs differ, but ISOs account for an economically trivial portion of 
executive equity pay. 
53 These option designs fall outside of a safe harbor within §409A.  As a result, they are treated like other deferred 
compensation, and under § 409A participant control over the timing of realization of deferred compensation results 
in penalties.  See infra note x and accompanying text.  In addition, indexed options and options granted in the money 
do not qualify for the safe harbor presumption of performance based pay applicable to at the money options.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (stock options deemed to satisfy the safe harbor presumption if, inter alia, “the 
amount of compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the stock after the 
date of the grant”). 
54 See Brian J. Hall, The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6674, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=108563 
(finding a “bias toward valuing options according [to] what they would be worth if exercised today”). 
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worth it.55  However, as we will see shortly, firms have embraced RPE in performance share 
plans that are economically similar to options, but do not suffer the same adverse tax 
consequences, suggesting that tax and accounting rules are the better explanations. 
II.  The Rise of Performance-Based Executive Compensation 
 According to the Hay Group, 27.4% of the ex ante value of compensation paid to the 
CEO’s of 300 of the largest U.S. companies in 2012 consisted of performance-based equity pay, 
that is, performance-based stock or options.56  A very large fraction of this pay would have 
consisted of performance-based stock.  The same Hay Group study found that 78% of these 300 
firms issued performance-based stock to their top executives in 2012, while only 5% issued 
performance-based options to this group.  (16.0% of the firms made awards to top executives 
under cash-based long-term performance plans.)57  Similarly, analyzing the compensation of top 
executives of over 1000 large public companies, Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy (BBCK) 
found that 97% of the firms that utilized performance-based equity pay issued performance-
based stock, while only 8% issued performance-based options.58   
Performance-based equity pay existed a decade ago, but was much less frequently 
observed.  BBCK’s data indicate that the fraction of equity pay consisting of performance-based 
pay has increased by 350% from 2001.59   
Meanwhile, use of the once ubiquitous conventional at-the-money stock option continues 
to decline.   These options accounted for only 16.4% of CEO pay for the Hay Group sample of 
firms in 2012.60  At the peak of the option boom around 2000, conventional options accounted 
for over 60% of senior executive pay.61  Rounding out the picture, use of conventional time-
vested restricted stock has increased modestly over the decade, and, with a 13.2% market share 
of CEO compensation for the Hay Group sample in 2012, conventional restricted stock may be 
overtaking conventional options for second position among equity pay categories.62 
Of course, the top 300 and even the top 1000 firms are only a subset of U.S. public 
companies.  Nonetheless, pay practices at these firms deserve close attention because they tend 
                                                 
55 See Dittmann et al, supra note x; Chaigneau et al, supra note x. 
56 Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data, Trends and Strategies 19 (2014). 
57 Hay Group (2014) at 20, 21. 
58 J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, Jeffrey Coles & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive 
Compensation, Table 1 (working paper, Dec. 18, 2013) (hereinafter BBCK (2013)).  BBCK’s sample was based on 
the largest 750 companies each year between 1998 and 2012 for a total of 1833 firms.  Roughly 1100 to 1400 firms 
are represented each year. 
59 BBCK (2013) at Table 1.  This figure actually understates the transformation.  Performance-accelerated stock and 
option grants made up a sizable portion of performance-based equity pay in 2001, and a negligible fraction in 2012.  
As discussed below, performance-accelerated equity is a closer kin to conventional stock and option pay than it is to 
today’s performance shares and performance-vested options. 
60 Hay Group (2014) at 19. 
61 Walker, supra (Vandy) at 633. 
62 Hay Group (2014) at 19, 22 (making this prediction). 
 The Way We Pay Now  
12 
 
to be leaders in the adoption of executive pay practices and because they make up such a large 
fraction of U.S. market capitalization.63  For the average investor, these are the firms that matter 
most from a governance perspective.   
Explaining the shift from options to performance shares really involves two questions: 
why the shift away from options, and why the shift to performance shares?  In hindsight, the 
heavy reliance on options in the late 1990s/early 2000s looks like a bubble induced by the 
artificially favorable accounting treatment of option compensation that was discussed above.64  
Recall that prior to a change in accounting standards adopted in 2004, firms incurred no charge 
to earnings at any point for conventional at-the-money options issued to executives and 
employees as compensation.  All other forms of compensation, including restricted stock, 
resulted in an accounting expense.  In 2004, the FASB mandated “fair value” accounting for all 
forms of equity compensation, leveling the accounting playing field for stock and options.65  
According to this view, once the thumb on the scale in favor of options was removed, options 
looked relatively less attractive and their use declined.66 
Other factors may have contributed to the shift away from options.67   The bursting of the 
dot-com bubble around 2000 and the end of “irrational exuberance”68 likely led to an increase in 
the perceived riskiness of options on the part of executives, reducing their attractiveness.69  
Options-related scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and other firms in the early 2000s, as well 
as a stock option backdating scandal in the mid-2000s, all made “options” something of a four 
letter word in the minds of the media, investors, and the general public.70  A tax cut on dividends 
in 2003 increased the attractiveness of dividends.71  Because their options are rarely “dividend 
protected”, executives holding options are thought to be averse to paying dividends.  Investors 
anticipating this antipathy might have pushed for fewer options in executive pay packages.72 
                                                 
63 The S&P 500 represents 80% of US stock market capitalization.  S&P Dow Jones Indices, Market Capitalization 
Coverage of S&P U.S. Equities, http://us.spindices.com/documents/additional-material/sp-500-trifold.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
64 Walker, supra (Vandy); Murphy supra. 
65 SFAS 123R, supra. 
66 Murphy, supra. 
67 Walker (Vandy) (discussing potential explanations for the shift away from conventional options). 
68 Alan Greenspan, 1996. 
69 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
70 Walker, supra (Vandy).  
71 The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 cut the top marginal federal income tax rate 
applicable to dividends from thirty-five percent to fifteen percent. For evidence on the impact on dividend payouts, 
see Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend 
Tax Cut, 62 J. Fin. 1935, 1935 (2007) (reporting that thirty-five percent of S&P 1500 firms increased dividend 
payouts in 2003 compared with twenty-seven percent increasing payouts in the two prior years and that the rate of 
firms newly adopting dividend programs increased from about one in a hundred in 2001 and 2002 to one in ten in 
2003). 
72 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
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The foregoing factors, and others, 73 might help explain a shift away from options and in 
favor of stock, but why the heavy shift into performance-based stock?  Why not conventional 
time-vested restricted stock?  We can’t be certain, but conventional time-vested restricted stock 
has several drawbacks as an equity pay instrument.  First, conventional time-vested restricted 
stock does not qualify as performance-based pay under § 162(m) of the tax code.74  In a world in 
which the median S&P 500 CEO receives annual compensation of over $10 million, the $1 
million senior executive pay deduction limitation under § 162(m) and the performance-based pay 
exception are important.75  By contrast, performance-based stock plans can easily qualify as fully 
deductible performance-based pay.76 
Second, the increasingly influential proxy advisory firms – Institutional Shareholder 
Services and Glass Lewis – do not consider time-vested restricted stock to be performance-based 
pay.  These firms tend to give negative recommendations on “say on pay” proposals when 
companies include significant levels of time-vested restricted stock in their proposed pay 
packages.77   
Third, and relatedly, boards may not believe that simple time-vested restricted stock 
provides the optimal incentives for executives.  We have seen that both stock and options tie pay 
to stock price performance, but that options, per dollar of compensation expense, provide more 
highly powered incentives than stock – incentives to increase the share price and incentives to 
take on risky projects.78 Of course, option pay can potentially lead to an excessive appetite for 
risk.  Some commentators have blamed heavy executive option portfolios for the excesses that 
led to the 2008 financial crisis.79  Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible that some directors would 
conclude that a wholesale shift from option pay to time-vested restricted stock would excessively 
discourage risk taking.  We will see that performance-based stock has incentive properties that 
                                                 
73 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
74 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) and note x, supra. 
75 Equilar, CEO Pay Strategies Report 8 (2014) (reporting median S&P 500 CEO total compensation for 2013 of 
$10.132 million).  The importance of qualifying executive pay as performance based would disappear if legislation 
proposed by Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-Tex.), and Senators Jack Reed (D-R.I.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) is 
enacted.  Both the House and Senate bills propose to disallow all deductions for exec pay in excess of $1 mm, 
regardless of composition.  See Equilar, CEO Pay Strategies Report 18 (2014). Donald Kalfen, House Bill Would 
Extend Reach of 162(m) to All Employees and Eliminate (Significant) Exemption for Performance-Based 
Compensation, Meridian Client Update, Meridian Compensation Partners, LLC. 1 (Feb. 22, 2014), 
http://www.meridiancp.com/wp-content/uploads/house-bill-will-eliminate-tax-exemption.pdf. 
76 Supra. 
77 See Institutional Shareholder Services, United States Taft-Hartley Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2015 Policy 
Recommendations 30 (Feb. 4, 2015), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015-taft-hartley-
advisory-services-us-guidelines.pdf; James F. Reda & David M. Schmidt, SAY-on-PAY: Changing How Executives 
Get Paid, 29(7) Financial Executive 24, 27 (Sep. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2376329. 
78 Walker, supra (Vandy). 
79 Lucian Bebchuk, Executive Pay and the Financial Crisis, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE & FINANCIAL REGULATION, http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/02/01/executive-pay-and-the-
financial-crisis/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, at 1-2 (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1513522. 
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are much closer to options than simple time-vested restricted stock.  Firms may have adopted 
performance-based stock plans to retain the incentive properties of options while abandoning a 
disfavored instrument. 
Finally, and more pessimistically, time-vested restricted stock is a fairly transparent 
device.  Boards and executives who are interesting in obfuscating pay levels might prefer a more 
opaque instrument, particularly one that can be undervalued through judicious selection of 
assumptions.80  As we will see below, performance-based stock plans are highly complex and 
opaque.  One cannot generate an ex ante value by plugging a few variables into an online 
calculator, as one can with options.  This point will be explored in greater detail in Part X below. 
III. Understanding Performance-Based Executive Compensation 
Performance-based pay is certainly not one size fits all.  Both stock and options are being 
granted to executives contingent on satisfaction of performance conditions.  We will look at both 
types of instruments (as well as cash-based performance plans), but the focus will be on the more 
common performance-based stock grants.  But even with respect to stock grants, there are 
variations along several dimensions – absolute and relative performance metrics, accounting and 
market-based hurdles, variable share versus fixed share awards.  Thus, it is not possible to 
provide a complete description that captures the entire range.  Nonetheless, this Part describes 
the major strands that make up the stock award sector of performance-based equity pay.   
A.  Performance-Based Stock Plans 
Like conventional restricted stock and restricted stock units, performance-based restricted 
stock can entail the issuance of shares or the equivalent promise to deliver shares at vesting.  The 
innovation here is that the shares vest only if both time and performance criteria are satisfied.      
Many different metrics are employed in designing performance-based stock plans, and 
many plans include more than one metric.  According to executive pay consultant F.W. Cook, 
the most popular metrics for 2013 equity grants at the largest U.S. public companies were (in 
descending order): total shareholder return, profit (EPS, etc.), capital efficiency (ROE, etc.), 
revenue, cash flow, and “other”, which might include safety or quality measures.81  45% of the 
companies in F.W. Cook’s sample used a single performance measure in their plans, with the rest 
using two or more measures.82 
                                                 
80 BFW, supra at 789 (discussing the critical role of camouflage in minimizing investor outrage and increasing 
executive pay under the managerial power view of the compensation-setting process). 
81 Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., The 2014 Top 250 Report 12 (2014) (hereinafter Cook (2014)).  Cook’s sample 
includes the 250 largest companies in the S&P 500 index. 
82 Cook (2014) at 13.  A recent study by Equilar provides similar data.  For 2013, they found that 40% of S&P 500 
firms that granted long-term performance awards to their CEOs used a single metric; 36% used two metrics; and the 
remaining 24% used three or more metrics.  Equilar (2014) at 2-3. 
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Another major design consideration is whether to base the plan on an absolute measure of 
performance, a measurement relative to a peer group, or both.  In F.W. Cook’s sample, a large 
majority of firms employing a total shareholder return metric used a relative measure, while the 
large majority of firms using accounting-based metrics employed absolute measures.83  In 
BBCK’s sample of top executive pay at large U.S. companies, 82% of firms issuing performance 
equity in 2012 employed at least one absolute metric and 48% employed at least one relative 
metric.  Obviously, many of these companies utilized both.84  
Finally, the number of shares potentially subject to vesting may be fixed or variable.  
Following the typical convention, I will use the term “performance-vested restricted stock” to 
refer to grants of a fixed number of shares or of units entailing the promise to deliver a fixed 
number of shares upon satisfaction of vesting conditions.  I will use the term “performance 
shares” to refer to performance-based stock plans involving a variable number of shares.   
Before turning to performance-vested restricted stock, I should say a word about 
performance-accelerated restricted stock.  Performance-accelerated restricted stock vests after a 
certain number of years, if the participant remains employed, but the shares can vest earlier if 
performance goals are achieved.  Fifty-two of 1369 firms (4%) in BBCK’s sample issued 
performance-accelerated restricted stock in 2004, but these instruments have virtually 
disappeared with only nine firms (less than 1%) issuing them in 2012.85  Given the paucity of 
these plans, and the fact that their incentive properties are not that different from conventional 
time-vested restricted stock, we will devote no more attention to them. 
1. Performance-Vested Restricted Stock 
Performance-vested restricted stock refers to grants of a single tranche of shares (or the 
equivalent promise to deliver the tranche) that vest only if both time and performance hurdles are 
achieved.  For example, in 2013 Medtronic provided its president, Omar Ishrak, with 72,585 
restricted stock units which vest on the third anniversary of the date of grant provided that Ishrak 
remains employed by Medtronic and that the company achieves a cumulative compound annual 
growth rate in earnings per share of 3%.86  Assuming that Ishrak remains in office, there are two 
possibilities.  If the company achieves the performance goal, Ishrak receives the shares, and the 
result is equivalent to simple time-vested restricted stock.  The value of the grant, ex post, is a 
linear function of the company’s share price at vesting.  If the performance goal is not met, 
Ishrak receives nothing.  The performance relationship here is not very nuanced, and 
unsurprisingly, the proxy materials note that the performance goal for vesting is “intentionally 
                                                 
83 Cook (2014) at 12. 
84 BBCK (2013) at Table 2, Panel E.  BBCK’s data represent firm years.  Some of this overlap could reflect 
performance equity plans utilizing both absolute and relative measures while some could reflect multiple plans at a 
given firm, one or more utilizing absolute and one or more utilizing relative metrics.  It is impossible to say from the 
data presented by BBCK. 
85 BBCK (2013) at Table 2, Panel A.   
86 Medtronic, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39, 51, 52 (July 12, 2013). 
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less than Medtronic’s target performance” for growth in EPS.87  In other words, this was 
designed to be an easy hurdle. 
While some firms employ easily achievable targets, other firms lessen the potential 
harshness of an all-or-nothing restricted stock performance hurdle of this sort by extending the 
period during which the performance goal may be achieved. For example, in 2013 Danaher 
Corp. granted RSUs to its executives that vest no earlier than the 4th and 5th anniversary of grant 
(50% on each anniversary) but that can vest as late as the 10th anniversary of grant.88  In order for 
these RSUs to vest, the company must achieve four consecutive quarters with adjusted EPS in 
excess of 110% of 2013 EPS and positive net income.89  As before, the value of the grant is a 
linear function of the share price at vesting, but in this case, vesting may be deferred, if necessary 
to achieve the performance goal. 
While the relationship between share price and actual payoff if the shares vest is linear, 
the relationship between share price and the expected payoff associated with the performance-
vested restricted stock issued to Medtronic’s Ishrak is non-linear, as illustrated in the figure 
below.  Although the company admits that the performance target is not aggressive,90 there is 
some possibility that it will not be achieved.  In all likelihood, Medtronic’s share price would 
suffer as a result.  There is, in other words, a positive correlation between the likelihood that the 
earnings growth target will be met (and that the shares will vest) and Medtronic’s share price.    
For illustration, I am assuming that the likelihood of vesting is zero if Medtronic’s share price is 
zero in three years’ time (a safe bet) and that the likelihood increases until it reaches 100% if 
Medtronic maintains the $39 share price that existed at the time of the 2013 grant to Ishrak.  But 
the details are not important.  The point is that in states of the world in which Medtronic is 
successful and its share price rises, the grant is equivalent to time-vested restricted stock, but in 
states of the world in which Medtronic suffers in performance and share price, there is a risk that 
the grant will not vest and will be worthless.  But to reiterate, since the relationship between 
Medtronic’s earnings growth and share price is not fixed – there is only some correlation – one 
cannot plot actual payoff value against future share price, only an illustrative expected payout.   
This payoff profile has something of the “hockey stick” look of the option payoff profile, 
suggesting some delta and vega in excess of those associated with conventional time-vested 
restricted stock.  But the “optionality” here is not pronounced.  The performance hurdle is not 
aggressive; the shares are likely to vest.  The incentives created by this instrument are not that 
different from conventional restricted stock.  
                                                 
87 Medtronic, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39. 
88 Danaher Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 47 (April 2, 2014). 
89 Danaher Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 47.  
90 Medtronic, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39. 
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2. Performance Shares 
We now turn to performance-based stock plans involving a variable share award, aka, 
performance shares. As noted, performance share plans may utilize any number of metrics and 
performance may be measured on an absolute or relative basis, or a plan may include both 
absolute and relative measures.  To simplify exposition, I will focus on simple plans involving 
either absolute or relative metrics.91 
a. Absolute Metrics 
While details vary, performance share plans typically define a range of company 
performance that results in a smoothly increasing number of shares vesting at the end of the 
performance period, which is most commonly three years.92  Most plans include a performance 
threshold.  If the threshold is not achieved, no shares are issued.  Plans also include a cap on the 
number of shares issued that corresponds to a maximum performance level.  Companies that 
employ profits, capital efficiency, revenue, and cash flow performance metrics generally look to 
company performance only, with no adjustment for peer or market performance.93  We’ll call 
these absolute performance metrics.  Plans employing relative performance metrics will be 
considered in the next subsection. 
                                                 
91 Well, not exactly.  It turns out that Coke has recently added a relative metric to its plan and CenturyLink has 
adopted an absolute performance cap on payouts from its relative plan.  These plans are complicated, but these two 
cases still provide helpful examples of the use of absolute and relative metrics. 
92 Cook (2014) at 14. 
93 Cook (2014) at 12. 
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For example, Coca-Cola has issued performance share units to its senior executives for 
several years.94  For several years, the sole performance measure was compounded annual 
growth in economic profit.95  Each year, the compensation committee determined a threshold, 
target, and maximum profit growth performance level based on company-specific and macro-
economic factors.  For their 2013 to 2015 plan, the threshold, target, and maximum profit growth 
levels were 4.4%, 6.4%, and 8.4%.96  In 2013, Coke’s CEO, Muhtar Kent, received performance 
share units of roughly 100,000 shares for threshold performance, 200,000 for target performance, 
and 300,000 for maximum performance.97  If the company fails to meet the threshold growth 
figure, he will receive no shares; if the company exceeds the maximum level, he will receive the 
maximum 300,000 shares.98  Between the threshold, target, and maximum performance levels, 
the number of shares issued is linearly interpolated.  The relationship between profit growth and 
shares issued is described in figure X. 
 
As the following chart demonstrates, the value of Kent’s award at payout is a function 
both of the growth in profits and the share price at payout.  Coke’s shares traded between about 
$36 and $43/share in 2013. 
                                                 
94 The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 56 (2014 Proxy).   
95 The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 57.  Coke added a relative total shareholder return metric to its plan 
beginning with the 2014-2016 performance period.  Id at 58. 
96 The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 57.  
97 The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 68.  The exact figures were 97,949, 195,898, and 293,847 shares, 
respectively. 
98 The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 57. 
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Of course, Coke’s share price and profit growth at the end of three years are likely to be 
correlated.  It is possible that Coke could meet or exceed its maximum profit growth target and 
suffer a drop in share price – the entire market could crash.  It’s also possible that Coke’s profits 
could languish and that its shares could rise 25% with an overall market surge.  In all probability, 
however, low profits growth will be associated with a low share price and high growth with a 
high share price.  As in the case of the Medtronic’s restricted stock grant, the relationship 
between share price at payout and expected payout value is probabilistic.  The following figure 
illustrates one possibility.  Simply for illustration, I have assumed that at a share price of $20 or 
below, it is highly unlikely that the threshold profit growth target will have been met.  At a share 
price of $60 or beyond, I assume that the maximum target will have almost surely been met.  In 
between, I assume an increasing likelihood that Coke will have achieved threshold, target, and 
maximum performance levels with increasing ex post share prices.  In this hypothetical case, the 
relationship between share price at payout and the expected value of the CEO’s PSUs is 
described by the solid line in the following figure. 
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The most important thing to note here is the multiplier effect.  As long as the 
performance measure and share price are correlated, higher performance levels result in the 
issuance of more shares and more valuable shares.  This leverage effect is not a feature of 
conventional time-vested restricted stock.  Also note the impact of the threshold performance 
level.  The award is valueless (ex post) unless and until a minimum performance level is 
achieved.  In combination, these features produce an economic relationship between share price 
and payoff that is very similar to that of an option, and this payoff profile more closely resembles 
the familiar “hockey stick” payoff profile associated with option compensation.  The option 
lives! 
BBCK have confirmed that performance-vesting conditions attached to restricted stock 
grants magnify the incentives created by these instruments.99  They analyzed the incentive 
properties of performance share units employing absolute metrics issued by a sample of large 
public companies between 1998 and 2008.  BBCK found that the addition of one accounting-
based metric, similar to the Coke plan, increased the delta of awards by an average of 72%.100  
BBCK also found that performance share plans with a single accounting-based metric delivered 
substantial vega, whereas conventional time-vested restricted stock grants create no vega.101   
                                                 
99 BBCK (2013). 
100 BBCK (2013) at 65 (table 6, panel C).  
101 BBCK (2013) at 67 (table 7, panel C).  See supra note x and accompanying text for discussion of delta and vega. 
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b. Relative Metrics 
Increasingly, performance share plans measure performance relative to that of a peer 
group or the overall market.102  Total shareholder return (TSR) – the increase in a company’s 
stock price plus dividends over some period – is a popular metric for performance share plans, 
and the large majority of TSR plans employ a relative measure of TSR.103  Aside from the 
comparative feature, the mechanics of these plans are generally quite similar to the Coca-Cola 
plan we just reviewed.  CenturyLink, a large telecom company, utilizes a typical relative TSR 
plan.104  Under the CenturyLink plan, executives receive performance-vested restricted stock that 
vests only if time and variable relative TSR performance hurdles are met.105  The reference group 
is the S&P 500.  A threshold level of stock will vest after three years if CenturyLink’s TSR over 
that period is at the 25th percentile of S&P 500 TSR.  50th percentile TSR performance results in 
a target level of stock vesting.  75th percentile TSR performance results in maximum vesting.  No 
shares vest if CenturyLink’s TSR rank is less than 25th percentile and no additional shares vest 
for performance ranking in excess of the 75th percentile.  Vesting levels are linearly interpolated 
for relative TSR performance between the 25th and 75th percentile.  However, while the basic 
performance measure is relative shareholder return, there is also an absolute performance 
overlay.  Under the CenturyLink plan, if absolute TSR over the relevant period is negative, no 
more than the target number of shares may vest.106   
The threshold, target, and maximum restricted shares issued to CenturyLink’s CEO, Glen 
Post, in 2012 were 29,422; 58,844; and 117,688.107  The relationship between CenturyLink’s 
relative TSR performance and the number of Post’s shares that will vest in three years (assuming 
he remains employed as CEO and the company achieves positive absolute TSR) is portrayed in 
the following figure. 
                                                 
102 J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, Jeffrey Coles & Brian Young, The Presence, Value, and Incentive Properties of 
Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation Contracts 10 (working paper, Feb, 2014) (hereinafter 
BBCY) (finding increased usage of RPE in performance based equity awards in a sample of 750 large companies 
between 1998 and 2012 with 37% of firms making RPE awards in 2012, and finding that of firms making 
performance-based equity awards in 2012, about half included RPE provisions).   
103 Cook (2014) at 12. 
104 CenturyLink, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (2013). 
105 CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 55. 
106 CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 55.  It appears from the proxy that the target number of shares is issued to a plan 
participant, but that a fewer or greater number of shares will vest depending on performance.  This seems to be a 
hybrid between a true restricted stock plan and a restricted stock unit plan.  The number of shares that is issued 
could be important because these shares carry voting rights unless and until forfeited.  Id.  Accrued dividends are 
paid at vesting depending on the number of shares that actually vest.  Id. 
107 CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 54. 
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As before, the value of the CEO’s stock award at payout is a function of both relative 
TSR performance and share price.  CenturyLink’s shares traded between about $37 and 
$43/share in 2012.  Let’s call it $40/share as a baseline. 
 
But also as before, the performance measure and share price are correlated.  In this case, 
TSR and share price are highly correlated.  TSR is share price (plus dividends).  The 
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complication here is that the performance measure isn’t CenturyLink’s absolute TSR 
performance, but relative TSR performance. 
Let’s begin by assuming that the S&P 500 index is flat over the three year period.  In that 
case, assuming that CenturyLink pays an average level of dividends, maintaining a $40 share 
price over three years should represent 50th percentile TSR performance.  A lower share price 
would place CenturyLink in the bottom half of performers.  For illustration, let’s assume that a 
$30 share price (a 25% drop) represents 25th percentile TSR performance relative to the S&P 
500.  Conversely, let’s assume that a 25% increase in CenturyLink’s share price to $50/share 
represents 75th percentile performance.  The relationship between share price and value to Post at 
payout in this illustrative case is portrayed in the following figure.108 
 
So far, the picture at CenturyLink looks very similar to that at Coca-Cola, but recall that 
CenturyLink employs a relative TSR metric.  Suppose that the S&P 500 index rises by 25% over 
the three year performance period.  Now for CenturyLink to maintain 50th percentile TSR 
performance (again assuming average dividend yields), its share price must rise by 25% to 
$50/share.  Under an absolute TSR plan, an increase to $50/share might have yielded maximum 
vesting; under a relative TSR plan in a bull market, only target vesting.  The relationship 
between share price and value under these two scenarios (flat S&P 500 and S&P 500 up 25%) is 
portrayed here.  Again, the exact relationship between performance and percentiles is unknown.  
This graph is purely for illustration. 
                                                 
108 Under this relative TSR approach, a specific ex post share price will represent 25th percentile performance and 
there will be an abrupt change in payoff at that point.  On an ex ante basis, one could smooth these curves to reflect 
expected payoffs. 
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Of course, the S&P 500 can also decline over the performance period, in which case 
simply maintaining a $40 share price at CenturyLink would represent superior performance.  
Under this relative TSR plan, participants would indeed receive more shares and more value for 
maintaining a flat $40 share price when the S&P 500 is down 25% than in scenarios in which the 
S&P is flat or rising, as seen here. 
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This, of course, is the point to using relative TSR performance in these plans.  Relative 
TSR plans increase the linkage between pay and firm-specific performance.  Executives are 
rewarded or penalized to a much lesser degree for overall market rises or declines than they 
would be under an absolute TSR plan, or, for that matter, if they held conventional options. 
By now, it may be apparent that a relative TSR performance share plan is very similar 
economically to an indexed stock option – an option with an exercise price that rises or falls with 
the rise or fall in an index.109  The relative TSR plan here is similar to an option with a strike 
price that rises or falls with the S&P 500 share index. 
B.  Performance-Based Option Plans 
The option analogs of performance-accelerated and performance-vested stock are 
occasionally used by large public companies.  Performance-accelerated options were more 
commonly observed in the late 1990’s/early 2000’s than performance-accelerated restricted 
stock, but these instruments have virtually disappeared today.110  80 firms in BBCK’s sample 
(6%) issued performance-accelerated options in 1999, but only one firm did so in 2012.111   
Vesting of performance-vested options is made contingent on the satisfaction of 
performance criteria as well as the passage of time.112  As with performance-vested restricted 
stock, performance metrics may include a variety of share price or accounting-based measures, 
and measurement may be made on an absolute or relative basis.  While more common than 
performance-accelerated options today, these instruments are much less frequently observed than 
performance-based stock.  In BBCK’s sample, only 59 of the firms in BCK’s sample (5%) issued 
performance-vested options in 2012.113   
Conventional stock options already provide executives with significant incentives to 
increase shareholder value (delta) and to increase volatility, perhaps by taking on risky projects 
(vega).  However, BBCK found that adding performance-vesting conditions to options 
substantially increased both delta and vega.114      
C.  Performance Cash Plans 
Adding to the heterogeneity of modern executive pay design, a small number of firms 
utilize multi-year cash-based performance plans.  These plans incorporate performance metrics – 
accounting and/or share value based – that are similar to those observed with performance share 
plans, and performance measurement may be done on an absolute or relative basis.  The BBCK 
                                                 
109 Supra. 
110 BBCK (2013) at 58 (Table 2, Panel A). 
111 BBCK (2013) at 58 (Table 2, Panel A). 
112 Hay Group (2013) at 20.  For an example of a performance-vested option plan, see HP’s 2015 proxy statement at 
pages 64 to 65 (describing vesting conditions for performance-contingent stock options based on share price 
appreciation or alternatively relative TSR performance). 
113 BBCK (2013) at 58 (Table 2, Panel A). 
114 Holding the value of the grant constant, BBCK found that adding one accounting (stock price) metric increased 
delta by 97% (30%) and increased vega by 314% (42%).  BBCK (2013) at 64-67 (Tables 6 & 7). 
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study did not include performance-cash plans, but the Hay Group’s recent study indicates that 
16% of the 300 firms studied made performance cash grants in 2012 (versus 78% issuing 
performance-based stock and 5% issuing performance-based options).115  In addition, single year 
cash-based performance plans are a very common element of executives’ annual incentive 
packages.   
Cash performance plans also provide incentives (direct or indirect) to increase 
shareholder value. However, they lack the leverage associated with the variable share 
performance share plans that have evolved as the single most important element, in aggregate, in 
top executive pay at the largest U.S. firms.  Given that fact, the remainder of this paper will focus 
on the benefits, and potential burdens, of performance-based stock plans.  To some extent, 
however, the benefits of performance-vested options and performance cash plans, and the 
concerns, are analogous to those of performance-based stock. 
IV. Performance-Based Executive Compensation – An Initial Assessment 
A. Advantages of Performance-Based Stock Plans 
Performance-based stock plans have several features that make them attractive as 
incentive compensation for senior executives.  Chief among these is flexibility.  
As we have seen, although they are nominally stock plans, performance-based stock 
plans can be designed to provide the kinds of high-powered incentives that we associate with 
options – strong incentives to increase share prices and incentives to take on risk.  In their recent 
work, BBCK find that the aggregate vega (the risk-taking incentive associated with 
compensation) provided by performance-vesting conditions attached to senior executive stock 
and option grants more than made up for the aggregate decline in conventional stock option use 
in the mid-2000s and the vega associated with these options.116  In earlier work, Hayes, 
Lemmon, and Qiu had found little evidence that the decline in option use in the mid-2000s was 
associated with firms adopting less risky financial and investment policies.117  This was 
surprising, and Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu interpreted their findings as suggesting that the risk-
inducing properties, or “convexity”, of options actually does little to align manager incentives 
with shareholder preferences with respect to risk.118  But an alternative explanation, supported by 
BBCK’s evidence, is that the aggregate level of convexity has been maintained, just with a 
different form of compensation.119 
                                                 
115 Hay Group (2013) at 21. 
116 BBCK (2013) at 36 and Figure 5. 
117 Rachel M. Hayes et al, Stock Options and Managerial Incentives for Risk Taking: Evidence from FAS 123R, 105 
J. Fin. Econ. 174, 176 (2012). 
118 Hayes et al, supra at 176. 
119 BBCK (2013) at 37. 
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Performance-based compensation utilizing relative performance metrics explicitly adopts 
relative performance evaluation, a feature of long-proposed, but very rarely observed, indexed 
options.  As we’ve noted, adding RPE to compensation contracts should increase efficiency by 
better focusing pay on performance within managerial control.  As a substitute for conventional 
options, relative performance-based plans can maintain high powered incentives while 
eliminating windfalls from bull markets and mitigating the problem of a bear market 
undermining those incentives.120  To be sure, commentators have suggested some reasons, aside 
from accounting and tax, that firms might forego the opportunity to index options, but none of 
these is terribly convincing.121  The ability to explicitly incorporate RPE into incentive contracts 
is a clear plus for performance-based equity pay. 
Performance share plans also can be designed to be effectively in-, at-, or out-of-the-
money.  Recall that an at-the-money option is issued with strike price equal to the market price 
of the stock at the date of grant.  The stock price must increase for the award to have value ex 
post.  Ignoring upward drift in share prices, as well as value-enhancing steps taken by the firm, 
one could think of an at-the-money option as one with a 50/50 chance of being exercised in the 
money.122  And one could think of a performance share plan in which there is a 50/50 chance of 
vesting as also being “at-the-money.” 
Consider the Medtronic performance-vested restricted stock plan.  Given the lack of 
variable share levels – it’s all or nothing – this plan is based on relatively easily achievable 
performance hurdles.123  The probability of these shares vesting is significantly greater than 50%.  
Economically, this is similar to a far in-the-money stock option.  If the shares are almost certain 
to vest, the value of the award rises and falls with the underlying share price.   
The relative total shareholder return (TSR) plan operated by CenturyLink is also 
analogous to an in-the-money option.124  Recall that CenturyLink need only achieve 25th 
percentile TSR performance for a threshold level of shares to vest.  A higher target level of 
shares vests with 50th percentile performance.  All else equal, there should be a 50/50 chance of 
                                                 
120 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
121 BFW at 803-809 (reviewing and critiquing proffered explanation for failure to index options, including 
suggestions that non-indexed options assist firms in retaining executives during bull markets and foster implicit 
collusion within certain industries).  As noted supra note x, Dittmann, Maug & Spalt and Chaigneau, Edmans & 
Gottlieb show that option indexation reduces incentives (delta) and suggest that the cost of maintaining incentives 
through issuing additional options may be prohibitive.  I would assume, however, that adopting relative performance 
hurdles for stock plans has a similar impact on delta, and yet many firms are embracing this approach.  It seems 
more likely that tax, accounting, or executive perceptions inhibited firms from issuing indexed options. 
122 Assuming 30% volatility, a 5% interest rate, and no dividends, a 3-year at-the-money option has about a 51% 
probability of closing in the money.  This is based on a European call option. 
123 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
124 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
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achieving 50th percentile performance and the inclusion of a lower threshold target puts this 
instrument in the money at grant.125   
In their study of performance share plans employing absolute performance metrics 
between 1998 and 2008, BBCK found that threshold performance was actually achieved in only 
47% of the cases.126  53% of the time, no shares vested.  On average, then, these plans seemed to 
be slightly out-of-the-money, at least in hindsight.  We do not have analogous ex post data for 
relative performance share plans, but one might expect that these plans are more likely to be 
equivalent to in-the-money options simply because of the common practice of using 50th 
percentile performance as a target for relative performance, with lower and higher percentiles 
equating to threshold and maximum performance.  This supposition is bolstered by simulations 
conducted by BBCY predicting that threshold performance in RPE plans will be achieved in 69-
76% of cases and that target performance would be achieved in 48-53% of cases.127 
There is nothing inherently objectionable about in-the-money pay instruments.  As noted 
above, researchers have found that in-the-money design is optimal in certain circumstances.128  
The advantages of an in-the-money design are that payouts are more certain and that the 
instrument continues to provide useful incentives over a greater range of ups and downs in 
company and market performance.  Of course, in-the-money instruments are more costly to grant 
than at- or out-of-the-money instruments, so fewer of these instruments should be issued, all else 
being equal. 
The overall theme here is that performance share plans offer tremendous flexibility in 
design that allow firms to issue pay instruments across the “moneyness” spectrum and, 
importantly, to mimic indexed options with relative performance metrics, as we saw with the 
CenturyLink plan.  There are two reasons that performance share plans are more flexible than 
conventional stock and options.  First, the moneyness of a performance share unit – particularly 
one employing absolute performance metrics – is not as obvious as it is with conventional equity.  
Absent backdating or other fraud, a conventional executive stock option issued by a company 
with publicly traded shares is clearly and transparently issued at-, in-, or out-of-the-money.  The 
“moneyness” of a conventional option is almost impossible to conceal.  One need only compare 
the option exercise price with the current stock market price to determine the moneyness.  But 
employees who might object to receiving an out-of-the-money conventional stock option are 
                                                 
125 In reality, because executives help determine plan design and plan metrics, we might expect firms to achieve 50th 
percentile performance targets more than 50% of the time.  As a result, these plans may be further in the money than 
they appear on the surface.   
126 BBCK (2013) at Table 3 (reporting ex post frequencies of performance attainment as well as simulated ex ante 
probabilities). 
127 BBCY at Table 6. 
128 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
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unlikely to realize that a performance share plan like Coke’s, for example, is effectively out of 
the money.129  Of course, there’s a cost to this opacity, which will be explored below. 
Second, the tax constraints that bar in-the-money and indexed options do not bar their 
effective replication with performance shares.  This is a technical point, but it is important in 
practice.  Under IRC § 409A, vested deferred compensation (broadly defined) that runs afoul of 
certain requirements is currently includable in income and subject to a 20% penalty tax.130  
Congress enacted § 409A in an effort to combat what it viewed as improper deferrals of income 
for tax purposes.  One particular concern was that executives had too much control of the timing 
of the receipt of their deferred compensation.131  Although stock options could be viewed as 
providing for deferral of compensation and could have been fully subjected to § 409A, the 
regulations provide a safe harbor exclusions for options.132  But the option safe harbor does not 
apply to in-the-money or indexed options.  It applies only if “the exercise price may never be less 
than the fair market value of the underlying stock… on the date the option is granted.”133  In-the-
money options are issued with an exercise price less than fair market value at grant, so they 
obviously violate this restriction, and indexed options may have an exercise price less than fair 
market value at grant (if the index moves down), so these instruments fall out of the safe harbor, 
as well. 
Deferred compensation that is not within a safe harbor – including in-the-money options, 
indexed options, and performance share plans – is subject to the rules of § 409A.  Options are 
problematic under § 409A because the employee controls the timing of exercise.  This is not a 
permissible distribution under § 409A, which allows penalty-free distributions from deferred 
compensation plans only in the events of death, disability, a predetermined fixed distribution 
date, change in control, and unforeseeable emergency.134  Because performance share plans have 
a certain payout date, they do not result in impermissible distributions, and thus firms utilizing 
performance share plans need not worry about particular design features (e.g., moneyness) that 
otherwise could trigger the penalty tax.135   
                                                 
129 I actually have no idea whether Coke’s plan is in-, at-, or out-of-the-money.  That’s my point.  One would have to 
have a feel for the likelihood of achieving the absolute profit growth metrics included in the plan to assess its 
“moneyness.” 
130 IRC 409A(a). 
131 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-658, at 39 (2008) (modifying § 409A and discussing its purposes).  Section 409A has 
been severely criticized for its ineffectiveness and complexity.  See Gregg D. Polsky, Fixing Section 409A: 
Legislative and Administrative Options, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 635 (2012); [Doran].  
132 Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A) (as amended in 2007).  Section 409A does not apply to time-vested restricted 
stock.  Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6)(i). 
133 Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A)(1). 
134 IRC § 409A(a)(2). 
135 To be sure, in the money or indexed options could be issued with fixed exercise dates, but I am not aware of any 
instance of compensatory options being issued with a fixed exercise date.  In all cases, the optionees have discretion 
to exercise between vesting and expiration.  Why exercise timing discretion is ubiquitous is an interesting question 
that is beyond the scope of this article.  The answer could be simple path dependence or something more nefarious.  
Placing the timing of options exercise in the hands of executives enables them to use inside information in timing 
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Of course, performance share plans provide flexibility in other ways as well.  While 
conventional stock and options tie rewards directly to share prices, and share prices only, 
performance share plans can include other performance metrics.  The scope to do so is unlimited.  
While the ultimate (economic) concern of investors is share price, it is conceivable that tying 
executive rewards more directly to sales growth, EPS, and similar metrics over the medium term 
is a more effective way of achieving high shareholder returns than focusing directly and 
exclusively on share prices.  This idea relates back to the concept that the most efficient 
incentive schemes tie rewards to performance that is within the managers’ control.136  Managers 
have more control over sales and earnings than over the price of their stock, particularly given 
swings in the market, so using alternative metrics in performance share plans could represent an 
improvement, although, to be sure, relative TSR plans also eliminate the risk of market price 
swings from executive pay contracts. 
Consistent with this rosy view, BBCK provide evidence that the issuance of 
performance-based equity awards is consistent with “contracting to promote CEO fit, incentive 
alignment, and sorting.”137 
B.  Challenges Raised by Performance-Based Equity Pay  
The flexibility of performance share plans is both a feature and a bug.  Often these plans 
are highly complex, and grant date valuation is difficult even for the simplest of performance 
share plans.  In addition, in some ways performance share plans are more gameable than 
conventional stock and option compensation.  Another current problem with performance share 
plans is that the accounting treatment differs significantly depending on the metrics utilized, 
likely leading to accounting-driven design choices.  Moreover, neither of the currently applicable 
accounting regimes is likely to produce reported compensation expense that matches the 
expected or actual value transferred to executives. 
1. Heterogeneity, Complexity, and Related Challenges 
Observed performance share plans rely on a broad range of performance measures, 
including both share price-related metrics and accounting-based metrics, such as profit, capital 
efficiency, revenue, and cash flow measures.  Within each of the accounting-based metric 
categories, one can find many different specific metrics.  For example, profit measures include 
EPS, EBITDA, net income, operating income, pre-tax profit, etc.138  Some plans adopt a single 
performance metric; other plans utilize several metrics.139  Moreover, as we have seen, some of 
these plans base payouts on absolute performance, while others measure performance relative to 
                                                                                                                                                             
exercise and sale of the underlying shares, which may be a low salience means of boosting executive pay.  I thank 
Gregg Polsky for highlighting this issue. 
136 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
137 J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, Jeffrey Coles & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Stock and Option Grants with Performance-
based Vesting Provisions, Rev. Fin. Studies 4 (2010). 
138 Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., The 2013Top 250 Report 9 (2013) (hereinafter Cook (2013)). 
139 About half of the companies in F.W. Cook’s sample employed multiple metrics in their performance-based 
equity plans in 2013.  See supra note x and accompanying text. 
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a peer group.140  It is very difficult to find two performance share plans with the same metrics.  
While this variety of approaches may reflect optimal matching of incentive schemes with firms, 
it makes firm-to-firm comparisons extremely difficult. 
Adding to the comparability problem is the inherent difficulty of estimating the value of 
performance share grants ex ante.  Compare conventional options.  Several well-accepted 
valuation methods for conventional options have been developed over the years and are 
recognized as acceptable techniques by FASB.141  Many firms utilize Black-Scholes option 
valuation methodology.  Black-Scholes is not a perfect fit for non-transferable, compensatory 
stock options, but by substituting an expected holding period for the contract term of a traded 
option, Black-Scholes provides a reasonable estimate of ex ante value (as well as of option delta 
and vega, which are important measures of incentive properties). 142  Other firms utilize binomial 
or lattice models to value compensatory options, while still others rely on Monte Carlo 
simulations.  These are all accepted valuation methods for compensatory options.   
To be sure, the outputs from these models are only as good as the inputs, and firms have 
significant discretion in selecting assumptions with respect to stock price volatility, interest rates, 
and dividend yields.  Not surprisingly, firms tend to use this discretion to reduce the reported 
grant date “fair value” of executive stock options.143  Nonetheless, as a result of option valuation 
innovations over the last several decades, observers are now able to calculate and firms are 
required to disclose a reasonably accurate and verifiable grant date value for a class of 
instruments that recently accounted for more than half of aggregate executive pay at large public 
companies. 
The substitution of performance-based equity for conventional options represents a step 
backward, at least initially, in terms of accuracy of valuation and disclosure of executive pay.  
Some stock option valuation methods can be adapted to the valuation of performance share plans 
that are based solely on stock price or stock market measures.144  For example, CenturyLink uses 
a Monte Carlo simulation to generate ex ante values for grants made under its relative TSR 
                                                 
140 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
141 ASC 718-10-55-16 (acceptable valuation techniques include, but are not limited to, lattice (i.e., binomial) 
models, closed form (i.e., Black-Scholes-Merton) models, and Monte Carlo simulations). 
142 ASC 718-10-55-18.  See also, SFAS 123R, Appendix B (discussing the bases for the FASB’s decision to 
mandate fair value accounting for options).  The Black-Scholes value of an option can be thought of as the 
discounted present value of the expected value of the option at payout.  
143 See Eli Bartov et al., Stock Option Expense, Forward-Looking Information, and Implied Volatilities of Traded 
Options (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=510042 (finding that firms 
opportunistically selected volatility measures to reduce reported compensation); Leslie David Hodder et al., Using 
Valuation Model Inputs to Manage Employee Stock Option Disclosures (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/FEA2004/FEApapers/A-S6_MLMcANALLY.pdf. (finding use of 
discretion to reduce pro forma earnings among a subset of firms); but see Steven Balsam et al., Managing Pro 
Forma Stock Option Expense under SFAS No. 123, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 31 (2003) (finding little evidence of 
manipulation of overall option expense but finding manipulation of allocation of expense to minimize the first year 
impact).   
144 ASC 718-10-55-17.   
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plan.145  But valuing grants made under a relative TSR plan is more complex than valuing a 
conventional option.  Different and potentially more manipulable assumptions are required – 
such as the cross-volatility between a firm’s share price and that of the relevant index or basket 
of stocks.   
The grant date valuation difficulties increase substantially when accounting-based 
performance measures are added to the mix.  Apparently, the FASB has concluded that there is 
currently no reliable approach for calculating the value of these instruments ex ante.146  As a 
result, the FASB has adopted a different approach to accounting for these instruments, which 
does not require any adjustment to grant date “fair value” on account of the incorporation of such 
hurdles.147  Instead, firms are required to estimate the number of shares that are most probable to 
vest given the performance hurdle.  This approach, which provides firms with tremendous 
discretion over reported executive pay levels, is further discussed below.148 
The bottom line is that grant date valuation of performance-based equity grants is not 
highly reliable.  It is significantly less reliable than ex ante valuation of conventional options.  
And we should not expect misreporting to be random.  Firms will tend to use discretion in 
choosing valuation methods and assumptions to reduce, not increase, reported executive 
compensation and overall firm compensation expense.  For example, in their study of 
performance share plans employing absolute performance metrics between 1998 and 2008, 
BBCK found that the median firm underreported the ex ante value of share price-based grants by 
25%.149  One pay consultant describes relative total shareholder return plans, such as the plan 
utilized by CenturyLink, as being “expense efficient,” meaning that the expense that must be 
reported under GAAP is relatively low compared with the value delivered to the executives.150  
At least they are honest about it.   
                                                 
145 CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 53. 
146 BBCK (2013) at 29. 
147 ASC 718-10-55-64. 
148 See infra TAN x.  In a nutshell, the performance condition is ignored in determining the grant date “fair value” 
and is subsequently taken into account by adjusting the accounting expense for any shares that failed to vest because 
the performance condition was not satisfied.  ASC 718-10-30-12. 
149 BBCK (2013) table 5.  BBCK also found that the firms in their study over reported the ex ante value of grants 
contingent on accounting metrics by about 19%. BBCK were puzzled by the over reporting of grant date “fair value” 
for this class of instrument.   The accounting treatment for these instruments is described further in the following 
section.  See also, Alexander Merz, Expensing Performance-Vested Executive Stock Options: Is Their 
Underreporting Under IFRS 2?, (working paper, April 2015) (finding statistically significant underreporting of 
compensation expense arising from grants of performance-vested stock options by German firms under the 
analogous accounting standard, IFRS 2); Craig W. Holden & Daniel S. Kim, Performance Share Plans: Valuation 
and Optimal Design 30 & Table 5 (working paper, March 2013) (finding that a sample of firms under-reported the 
grant date value of awards with an EPS metric and over-reported the value of awards with a revenue metric (both of 
which are accounting-based metrics)). 
150 Radford, Relative Total Shareholder Return Plans: The Low-Hanging Fruit of Optimal Performance-Based 
Equity Design 4 (undated), available at 
https://www.radford.com/relativeTsr/files/Relative_TSR_Optimal_Equity_Design.pdf.  
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The added difficulty and unreliability of valuation are not totally unexpected.  Not all 
performance-based plans include RPE, but introducing RPE does necessarily complicate matters.  
Valuing the indexed options proposed by Rappaport and others back in the 1990s would also 
have been more complex than valuing conventional compensatory options.  Nonetheless, the 
retrograde move is troubling for several reasons. 
First, as suggested above, difficulty in valuing performance-based equity grants ex ante 
makes it much more challenging to compare heterogeneous pay packages being granted to 
different executives at different firms, which undermines any market-based discipline being 
imposed on executive pay.  Second, investors cannot be certain of the level of compensation 
being paid to their senior managers.  The true expected value of this compensation is likely to be 
greater than firms report in their proxy statements.  The SEC has recently announced rules 
implementing the Dodd-Frank requirement that firms disclose the ratio between CEO pay and 
median employee pay.151  Like others,152 I am skeptical that this innovation will do much to 
moderate executive pay, but I am also skeptical that the CEO pay figures – based on reported 
grant date compensation153 – will be accurate for CEOs receiving performance-based equity 
pay.154  Third, absent a tool like Black-Scholes, it is difficult for directors, investors, and 
participants to understand the impact of adjustments to plan terms – the tradeoffs between plan 
length, the number, type, and aggressiveness of performance hurdles, etc. 
Moving away from valuation issues per se, investors and regulators also should be 
concerned that the complexity and opacity of these plans leads to gaming by boards and 
executives.  The choice of a particular performance metric may reflect optimal matching of 
incentive to executive, but it could also reflect inside information on the part of executives.155  
Suppose, for example, that the CEO of Acme believes that the firm’s chronic under-performance 
with respect to sales is likely to be reversed during the next several years as a result of a number 
of long-term initiatives.  A performance share plan based on relative sales performance would be 
just the ticket for the CEO and the executive team.  Everyone might be happy ex post with the 
improved sales performance and the corresponding executive compensation, but only the 
                                                 
151 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, August 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html. 
152 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance (Working Paper, 2015). 
153 The SEC release specifies that in calculating the pay ratio, CEO pay is to be determined in accordance with Item 
402(c)(2)(x) of SEA Reg. S-K, which is the bottom line total compensation figure from the summary compensation 
table. 
154 The SEC has also specified use of grant date pay data for its new “Pay Versus Performance” disclosure 
regulation, which requires firms to compare executive pay with total shareholder return.  See Pay Versus 
Performance, SEC Release No. 34-74835; File No. S7-07-15 (April 29, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 26330 
(May 7, 2015) (“Pay-Versus-Performance Release”), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34- 
74835.pdf.  Obviously, inaccuracies in performance share award valuation would be equally troubling in this 
context. 
155 See Yaron Amzaleg et al, CEO Control, Corporate Performance and Pay-Performance Sensitivity (working 
paper, 2014) (finding in a sample of Israeli companies that more powerful CEOs achieve high pay-performance 
sensitivity contracts during periods of strong corporate performance). 
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executives would realize that the performance hurdle was relatively unambitious under the 
circumstances.  Similar gaming could take place with respect to the peer group selected for 
relative performance evaluation.  There is evidence that executive compensation peer group 
members are selected with an eye towards justifying higher CEO pay.156  There is little reason to 
think that cherry picking of this type does not take place in designing performance share plans 
that incorporate relative performance metrics. 
Another game that firms and executives could play would be to create purposefully 
complex and opaque performance-based equity plans that would increase their ability to report 
low values for executive pay.  This gaming opportunity will be discussed more fully in the 
following section. 
2. Accounting for Compensation Expense Arising from Performance-Based 
Executive Pay  
The accounting treatment of performance shares is important for two reasons.  First, that 
treatment determines the magnitude of the single largest component, in aggregate, of executive 
pay as reported in the key summary compensation table in company proxy statements.  The SEC 
mandates disclosure of the grant date value of all elements of executive pay, but the FASB 
determines how the “fair value” of performance shares and other equity pay awards is to be 
calculated.  For better or worse, that table now serves as the primary benchmark for discussions 
of executive pay, case by case, and market wide.  The second reason that the accounting 
treatment matters is that performance equity is not limited to the executive suite.  At IBM, for 
example, over 500 executives receive performance shares.157  While CEO pay gets all the press, 
aggregate executive pay has a greater impact on reported earnings.  Thus, firms are likely to care 
about the magnitude of grant date CEO/senior executive pay as well as firm-wide compensation 
expense, both at grant and as ultimately recorded in the books. 
At present, two different accounting regimes may apply to performance share plans 
depending on the type of performance measures employed.158  Although the differences are not 
as stark as the pre-2006 difference between stock option accounting and accounting for other 
forms of compensation, this difference may be large enough to influence plan design.  More 
importantly, both of the current regimes encourage under-valuation and under-reporting of 
executive pay, a problem that already existed with respect to conventional options, but is 
heightened with performance-based equity.  It may be time to change course and adopt mark-to-
market accounting for these instruments and for equity pay generally. 
                                                 
156 Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer 
Groups, 96 J. Fin. Econ. 257 (2010) (finding that “firms appear to select highly paid peers to justify their CEO 
compensation”); John Bizjak et al, Are All CEOs Above Average? An Empirical Analysis of Compensation Peer 
Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. Fin. Econ. 538 (2011) (finding that “peer groups are constructed in a manner that 
biases compensation upward”). 
157 IBM 2015 Proxy Statement at 23. 
158 See supra TAN x.  
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Under US GAAP, accounting for equity compensation is governed by ASC Topic 718.159 
These rules first distinguish between equity awards and liability awards.160  Grants that are 
settled with stock are equity awards.161  Equity awards include conventional options and 
restricted stock, and performance-based stock and options.  Cash settled grants are liability 
awards.162  Liability awards included cash-settled stock appreciation rights (SARs)163 and cash-
settled performance plans, which were briefly discussed above.164   
Under ASC Topic 718, liability awards are accounted for on a mark-to-market basis.165  I 
will return to mark-to-market accounting shortly.  For equity awards, compensation cost arising 
from an award is set equal to the fair value of the award at grant (less any amount paid for the 
award), and is not subsequently adjusted unless the award is modified.166  However, this cost, 
and the way it is recorded as an expense, differs depending on the performance measure used.167   
In cases in which performance measures consist solely of share price or market metrics, 
such as CenturyLink’s relative TSR plan, firms are required to calculate a fair value at grant, 
reflecting the market condition, using an appropriate model, such as a Monte Carlo simulation.168  
Firms must use reasonable and supportable estimates of share price volatility, interest rates, and 
expected dividends as model inputs.169  The fair value that is calculated in this fashion is 
expensed ratably over the performance period.170  The value is not updated over time to reflect 
new information on the likelihood that the conditions will be satisfied, but it is adjusted for the 
number of shares expected not to vest because of failure to meet retention requirements.171  This 
is essentially the same accounting treatment that applies to conventional stock options.  FASB 
refers to performance measures of this type as “market conditions,” and I will refer to the 
corresponding accounting treatment as “market condition accounting” or the “market condition 
method.” 
                                                 
159 Formerly known as SFAS 123R.   
160 See generally, Frederic W. Cook & Co., Accounting for Stock Compensation under FASB ASC Topic 718 (Sept. 
12, 2013) (hereinafter Cook (ASC 718)) for an overview of these accounting rules.  See generally, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Guide to Accounting for Stock-based Compensation; A Multidisciplinary Approach 
(hereinafter PWC), for a more in depth treatment. 
161 There are exceptions, but within the universe of plans considered herein, stock-settled awards are equity-based 
awards.  See ASC 718-10-25-6; 25-19.  See also, PWC at 1-18.  
162 See ASC 718-10-25-6; 25-19.  See also, PWC at 1-46 – 1-47. 
163 SARs are analogous to stock options.  The recipient controls the timing of exercise, but at exercise the recipient 
receives the “spread” on the instrument in cash. 
164 Supra. 
165 ASC 718-30-35; PWC at 1-13; Cook (ASC 718) at 5. 
166 ASC 718-10-30; PWC at 1-13. 
167 ASC 718-10-30; PWC at 1-18 – 1-22. 
168 ASC 718-10-30-14; 718-10-55-13 to 55-20.  See also PWC at 1-21 and chapter 6; Cook (ASC 718) at 7.  
169 ASC 718-10-55-21 to 55-26.  See also, PWC chapter 7. In cases in which dividends do not accrue during the 
performance period, the fair value of performance shares is reduced by the present value of the expected stream of 
dividends issued between grant and vesting.  See Cook (ASC 718) at 3. 
170 ASC 718-10-35-2.  See also, PWC at 1-24. 
171 ASC 718-10-30-14.  See also, PWC at 1-21; Cook (ASC 718) at 7.   
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If performance share awards include only an accounting-based performance condition, 
such as Coca-Cola’s profit growth metric, the accounting treatment is quite different.  The grant 
date “fair value” that is calculated for the award is not reduced to reflect the probability that the 
award will not vest as a result of the performance condition.172  The “fair value” per share is not 
an estimate of the fair value of the award at grant at all; it is simply the share price prevailing on 
the grant date.173  However, firms are required only to recognize an expense with respect to 
shares that are probable to vest.174  At grant this is often the number of shares equating to 
“target” performance.  And any expense previously recognized for a share that was once deemed 
probable to vest is reversed if later it is no longer probable that the share will vest.175  In this 
situation, a share may not be probable to vest either because of the accounting-based 
performance condition or because of the retention requirement.176  Somewhat confusingly, FASB 
refers to performance measures of this type as “performance conditions.”177  I will refer to the 
corresponding accounting treatment as “performance condition accounting” or the “performance 
condition method.” 
A performance share plan may incorporate both market conditions and accounting-based 
“performance conditions.”  In such a case a grant date fair value would be determined using an 
appropriate model that incorporates the impact of the market condition.  Then, that fixed value 
per share would be multiplied by the number of shares that were deemed probable to vest at 
various points in time taking into account the accounting-based condition in order to generate the 
compensation expense recognized by the firm.178 
a. Performance Condition Accounting  
Although performance shares may include both market-based vesting hurdles and 
accounting-based hurdles, we will first consider the accounting issues associated with awards 
that include only one of these two types of conditions, beginning with accounting-based 
performance conditions.  Presumably, FASB’s failure to require firms to model and calculate a 
true grant date fair value for awards that incorporate accounting-based performance conditions 
                                                 
172 ASC 718-10-30-12, 13; PWC at 1-21; Cook (ASC 718) at 7. 
173 ASC 718-10-55-10; Cook (ASC 718) at 3 (full value awards) and 7 (vesting conditions).  See also Coca-Cola 10-
K (for year ended 12/31/13) at 106 (“fair value of the performance share units is the quoted market value of the 
Company’s stock on the grant date”)  The disclosed compensation is the product of this fair value and the number of 
shares probable to vest at grant.  At Coke, and most other firms, this is the number of shares that will vest if target 
performance is achieved. 
174 ASC 718-10-25-20; PWC at 1-21.  Outcomes are probable if “the future event(s) are likely to occur.”  ASC Topic 
450.  Where several future outcomes are possible, as in the case of performance share plans with variable numbers 
of shares potentially vesting, accounting accruals prior to vesting are based on the most probable outcome at any 
given measurement point. 
175 ASC 718-10-25-20; PWC at 1-21. 
176  ASC 718-10-25-20, -21. 
177 Per ASC 718, “performance conditions” include “performance target(s) defined solely by reference to the 
employer’s own activities” but may also include targets “defined by reference to the same performance measure of 
another entity or group of entities.”  ASC 718-20-20. 
178 See ASC 718-20-55-61, through -67 for an example. 
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reflects skepticism that these awards can be valued accurately.179  However, the performance 
condition method provides firms with a great deal of discretion in reporting grant date executive 
pay and, depending on the payout structure, may result in a downward bias in expected 
compensation expense firm wide. 
i.  Structural Bias 
Consider the following simplified relative performance share plan.  After three years, 
Acme’s CEO will receive 50,000 shares if the company achieves 25th percentile relative 
performance, 100,000 shares for 50th percentile performance, and 150,000 shares for 75th 
percentile performance, with the share award linearly interpolated between 25th and 75th 
percentile performance.  To simplify, we’ll assume that Acme’s share price at grant is $2/share, 
that share price and relative performance are tightly correlated, and that the overall market is flat 
over the three years, such that Acme’s achieving 50th percentile performance would be 
associated with a $2/share stock price at payout as well as at grant.180  We will also assume that 
Acme’s Time 2 share price is a linear function of percentile performance, ranging from $1/share 
at 0 percentile performance to $3/share at 100th percentile performance.181  These assumptions 
are summarized in the following table: 
Relative 
Performance at 
Time 2 
# of Shares 
Vesting 
Share Price at 
Time 1 
Expected Share 
Price at Time 2 
0 Percentile 0 $2 $1.00 
25th Percentile 50,000 $2 $1.50 
50th Percentile 100.000 $2 $2.00 
75th Percentile 150,000 $2 $2.50 
100th Percentile 150,000 $2 $3.00 
 
I have not specified the nature of the performance condition, and, of course, that’s critical 
under ASC 718.  Let’s first assume that Acme’s plan is based on relative earnings per share 
(EPS) performance.  Given the inclusion of that accounting-based performance condition (and no 
“market condition”), the “fair value” of the shares will be the grant date value of $2/share.  
Recall that the “fair value” per share under this approach is simply the share price at grant. 
Expense recognition is based on that fair value and the number of shares that are probable to 
vest.182   If the most probable outcome at grant is 50th percentile performance, Acme will begin 
accruing $200,000 of compensation expense. Over time, as Acme’s performance improves or 
                                                 
179 See BBCK (2013) at 24, 29 (noting that techniques for valuing awards with accounting-based performance 
metrics “are undeveloped or nonexistent”). 
180 In addition to assuming that the market is flat over the performance period, I am assuming there is no time value 
difference between grant and payout. A more complicated model would include upward drift in share prices and a 
discount factor based on borrowing costs. 
181 The exact figures selected for this illustration are unimportant, but it is important that the share price increases 
and decreases associated with higher and lower relative performance are symmetric. 
182 Supra. 
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regresses versus its competitors, Acme will update its expense calculation if another scenario 
becomes the most probable scenario, but no direct adjustment will be made for changes in share 
price.  Ultimately, however, the expense associated with this grant will be the product of 
$2/share (the “fair value” at grant) and the number of shares that actually vest.  That final 
expense is represented by the heavily dashed line in the following figure and is labeled 
“performance condition accounting.” 
 
The realized value of this grant, represented by the solid line in the figure, reflects the 
leverage associated with performance share plans under which superior performance is linked to 
both more shares and more valuable shares, and inferior performance is linked to fewer, and less 
valuable shares.  Under these assumptions, performance condition accounting results in a 
downward bias in expected compensation expense.  Of course, we do not know what level of 
performance ultimately will be achieved, but if we assume a normal distribution of outcomes 
centered on 50th percentile performance, it is obvious by inspection that the extent to which the 
performance condition accounting expense exceeds realized values between 25th and 50th 
percentile performance is more than offset by the extent to which realized values exceed the 
performance condition accounting expense between 50th and 75th percentile performance.  In 
addition, while outcomes below 25th and above 75th percentile performance may be relatively 
rare, low outcomes result in no gap between performance condition method expense and realized 
values (since both are zero), while high outcomes result in significant under-valuation under the 
performance condition method. 
Now imagine a plan identical in all ways except that the performance measure adopted is 
relative total shareholder return (TSR), a market condition under ASC 718.  In this situation, 
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Acme would use a model to determine the fair value of the grant incorporating the relative TSR 
hurdle.  If Acme adopts unbiased model inputs, presumably the fair value under this approach 
would be the realized values in the figure multiplied by the probability of their occurrence.183  
Acme would be required to expense that amount uniformly over the vesting period, regardless of 
which, if any, of the performance conditions is ultimately achieved.184  Rarely would the CEO’s 
realized value match the compensation expense recognized by Acme, but there is no structural 
bias inherent in market condition accounting. Again, assuming that the simulation inputs are 
unbiased, an assumption we will relax below, simulation-based approaches produce unbiased 
compensation expense recognition.   
Given the structure of the hypothesized performance share plan and my assumptions, 
expected compensation expense is less than the executive’s expected realization.185  But what 
about grant date executive pay reporting?  Assuming unbiased assumptions, the amount of grant 
date compensation disclosed would be more than the expected expense but could be more or less 
than the expected realized payout.  In the example above, assuming 50th percentile performance 
is most probable at grant date, $200,000 of compensation would be reported for the CEO.  But 
the expected value of the dashed, performance condition accounting line is less than $200,000.  
That expected value would be exactly $200,000 if 50,000 shares vested between 0 percentile and 
25th percentile performance.186  That would produce complete symmetry in the dashed line.  But 
instead we have the “hockey stick” payout profile with no shares vesting until threshold 
performance is achieved.  On the other hand, it is clear that the expected value of realized pay 
exceeds the expected expense.  Whether that difference partially, perfectly, or over-fills the low-
end gap depends on plan details.  It is possible that firms disclosing grant-date values for 
performance share plans using this method are over-reporting executive pay levels.  This 
phenomenon could explain, in part, BBCK’s findings that firms in their sample tended to 
disclose performance share plan compensation, involving a single accounting-based metric, that 
exceeded their simulated values.187 
ii.  Grant Date Discretion 
The structural bias inherent in the performance condition accounting method described 
above results in expected compensation expense being less than the expected realized value of 
the pay award.  Minimizing this expected expense would be of interest to firms that issue 
                                                 
183 The expected realized value would be discounted to the grant date to determine “fair value,” but in this simplified 
example I am ignoring time value differences between grant and payout.  See supra. 
184 ASC 718-10-35-2.  See also, PWC at 1-24; Cook at 7. 
185 Of course, performance share plans do not necessarily exhibit these features.  As we have seen, one of the 
advantages of performance share plans is the tremendous flexibility to customize metrics to create whatever 
incentives a compensation committee desires to create.  One could design a performance share plan for which the 
performance condition method results in expected compensation expense in excess of expected realized value.  But 
the plans that I have studied tend to mirror the example considered above.  Moreover, given that the performance 
condition method is essentially elective (through choice of performance metrics), one would expect that most firms 
using the performance condition method are reporting systematically low compensation expense figures. 
186 Again assuming a normal distribution of outcomes centered on 50th percentile performance. 
187 BBCK (2013) at 29. 
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performance shares widely and are concerned about minimizing aggregate compensation 
expense and maximizing reported earnings.  But as we have seen, the impact of this structural 
bias on the reported level of executive pay at grant is ambiguous. 
But for firms focused on minimizing disclosed grant date CEO pay, another feature of 
performance condition accounting looms large.  This feature gives firms tremendous discretion, 
really unaccountable discretion, in proxy statement disclosure of ex ante executive pay. 
ASC 718 instructs firms not to adjust the “fair value” of awards for the existence of 
performance conditions, such as the accounting-based performance metrics we have discussed.  
In cases in which awards carry no “market condition,” the “fair value” of awards with 
performance conditions is simply the grant date stock price.  But the associated compensation 
expense is this fair value multiplied by the number of shares probable to vest.188  Ultimately, this 
will be a certain, totally transparent figure for each grant, but at the time of the grant and in the 
interim between grant and vesting, firms have tremendous discretion in determining the number 
of shares probable to vest, and the FASB provides no specific guidance on this point. 
As PricewaterhouseCoopers notes, interpretation of the term “probable” in this context 
should be consistent with other FASB guidance suggesting that probable means “likely to 
occur.”189  But as PWC also notes, management judgment is required in determining whether 
performance conditions are likely to be achieved and, if so, at what level.190 
Coca-Cola’s approach appears to be typical.  The value of performance shares reported in 
its summary executive compensation table is the product of the share price at grant and the 
number of shares that will vest if target performance is achieved.191  By implication, the 
compensation committee has determined that it is most probable that this level of profits growth 
will be achieved during the three-year performance period.  As is typical, there is no discussion 
in Coke’s proxy statement or 10K of the basis for this particular determination. 
A firm intent on minimizing reported executive pay (vis-a-vis expected compensation) 
would use this discretion to adopt undisclosed assumptions minimizing the most probable 
performance level achievement at grant.  If it turns out later that performance exceeds that 
prediction, the executives will prosper and, indeed, the realized compensation will be reported 
elsewhere in the proxy statement, but the disclosure of grant date pay will remain low.  
I certainly do not mean to suggest that Coca-Cola has adopted this strategy.  Just the 
opposite appears to have been true in recent years, at least.  Coke bases grant date disclosures on 
                                                 
188 Supra. 
189 PWC at 1-21. 
190 PWC at 1-24. 
191 The Coca-Cola Company, 2014 Proxy Statement, at 63, 68.   
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target performance levels, but it has failed to achieve that level of performance for several 
years.192  Coke recently has over reported grant date pay, at least in hindsight. 
BBCK report that between 1998 and 2008, firms generally over-reported the grant date 
value of awards incorporating accounting-based metrics (relative to their own simulations).  As 
we have seen, one reason might be that the application of the performance condition accounting 
approach to “hockey stick” award structures results in “most probable” grant date valuation 
exceeding expected payoffs.193  Another reason might be that firms are setting target levels of 
performance that are something of a stretch.  Recall, that awards pay off, albeit at lower levels, if 
threshold performance targets are achieved.  But if firms substitute target performance for 
“probable” performance at grant date, these stretch targets would result in over-reported grant 
date pay under this method.  But there is no reason that firms cannot set stretch targets and report 
grant date executive pay based on more probable, even easily achievable, levels of performance.   
Ultimately, some number of shares (possibly zero) will vest.  Firms will have zero 
discretion over the ultimate compensation cost associated with performance share plans 
including only performance conditions.  However, as long as observers focus primarily on the 
grant date value of executive pay packages, the discretion described above could be immensely 
attractive to firms with concerns about perceived levels of executive pay. 
b. Market Condition Accounting  
I argued above that the market condition accounting approach, which the FASB requires 
for performance share plans incorporating a share-price or market metric, produces an unbiased 
fair value as long as the inputs are unbiased.194  But there is reason to suspect that firms will 
adopt biased assumptions that result in systematically under-valued compensation.  As noted 
above, firms have discretion in their choice of assumptions that feed into the models used to 
value instruments under a simulation-based accounting regime, and currently those assumptions 
are not being uniformly subjected to public scrutiny.195  Firms may employ favorable 
assumptions that would not stand up to close examination.  In contrast to performance condition 
accounting, the under-valuation that results from opportunistic selection of assumptions is 
permanent.  It affects reported grant date executive pay figures as well as the ultimate expense 
charged against earnings.  
There is evidence that firms granting conventional stock options use their discretion in 
selecting assumptions with respect to stock price volatility, interest rates, and dividend yields to 
                                                 
192 The Coca-Cola Company, 2015 Proxy Statement, at 54 (reporting that maximum performance was achieved for 
the 2010-2012 performance period, but that performance has been below threshold since and is expected to be below 
threshold for the 2013-2015 performance period).   
193 Supra. 
194 Supra. 
195 Supra. 
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reduce the grant date fair value of these options.196  The scope to do so with respect to 
performance shares is even greater.  Depending on the metric, more assumptions and less 
standard assumptions are required.  For a relative TSR plan, for example, a firm would not only 
need an assumption as to share price volatility, but also the cross-volatility between its share 
price and those of its peer group, a more obscure figure that would be more difficult to confirm. 
Moreover, the choice of plan metrics is unlikely to be random.  Firms and managers may 
use inside information to select performance targets that are more easily achieved than they 
would appear to be to an uninformed observer.  For instance, in my example above, the insiders 
may have reason to believe that the firm is likely to outperform its peers in total shareholder 
return over the relevant period such that the actual, informed probability of achieving 50th or 75th 
percentile performance is greater than random walk analysis would suggest.  If so, the 
simulation-based market condition accounting approach, employing the stated probabilities, 
would produce an artificially low “fair value.”  Moreover, given the flexibility, opacity, and 
incentives to minimize reported compensation expense, we would expect under-valuation to be 
systematic, although perhaps not universal. 
As noted above, BBCK found significant under-reporting of grant date compensation 
expense for a sample of share-price contingent performance awards granted between 1998 and 
2012 by 750 large US companies.  Reported compensation expense was 20% less than BBCK’s 
simulated valuations.197 
c. How About Both? 
In combination, the forgoing sections suggest that the optimal strategy for an aggressive 
firm wishing to minimize expected and reported executive compensation expense would be to 
adopt a performance share plan with both market and accounting-based performance conditions.  
Consider, for example, CEO performance shares that vest only if both EPS and TSR hurdles are 
satisfied (the hurdles don’t have to be very high).  Given the TSR hurdle, the issuer would be 
required to use a model to determine the grant date fair value of the award, incorporating the 
TSR hurdle but ignoring the EPS hurdle.  That exercise provides the opportunity for an 
aggressive firm to select model inputs that will yield a downward-biased fair value at grant.  The 
initial expense associated with this grant and reported in the all important summary 
compensation table of the proxy statement will be based on this downward biased “fair value” as 
well as the number of shares probable to vest, given the EPS hurdle, which provides another 
opportunity for aggressive selection of assumptions.  Ultimately, some number of shares will 
vest, eliminating discretion along that dimension, but given the structural downward bias 
inherent in performance condition accounting, the expected expense associated with such a grant 
will be twice reduced – once from the downward biased “fair value” and second by the 
asymmetric payout that is not reflected in performance condition accounting. 
                                                 
196 Supra. 
197 BBCK (2013) at 21, 28, and table 3. 
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d. Firm Choice of Plan Design and Accounting Regime 
The use of performance shares is on the rise, and design practices are rapidly evolving.  
Most plans, however, incorporate multiple metrics and, in all likelihood, both market and 
performance conditions. 
Among large firms, the single most popular metric for performance share plans is total 
shareholder return (TSR).  In its survey of compensation practices at 300 large firms, the Hay 
Group found that 47% utilized TSR as a performance measure in 2012.198  In more recent 
reports, both Frederick W. Cook and Equilar have reported 58% of sample firms utilizing a TSR 
measure.199  Both ISS and Glass Lewis have endorsed the use of TSR metrics, particularly 
relative TSR, as an effective means of tying compensation to long-term firm performance.200  
Given those endorsements, the popularity of TSR metrics is not surprising. 
But firms are increasingly utilizing multiple performance measures in their plans.  Cook 
reports 55% of sample firms utilizing multiple performance measures in 2014, up from 52% in 
2012.201  Equilar reports 60% of sample firms utilizing multiple measures,202 while Hay reports 
70% of sample firms utilizing multiple performance measures.203   
This data does not tell us how many firms are combining market condition accounting 
with performance condition accounting, but it is likely to be prevalent.  Cook reports that 70% of 
the firms in its sample that utilize a TSR metric do so in combination with a one or more 
financial metrics.  Adopting a TSR metric triggers market condition accounting, while use of 
financial metrics would invoke performance condition accounting. 
Moreover, despite the enduring popularity of TSR, a market metric, BBCK document the 
increasing popularity of accounting-based performance metrics.  Between 2006 and 2012, 75-
80% of the firms in BBCK’s sample that granted performance-based equity incorporated an 
accounting-based metric in their plans, up from 55-60% of firms that did so between 1998 and 
2002.204  Consistent with these other accounts, accounting-based metrics did not necessarily 
displace stock price-based metrics.  In BBCK’s sample, use of stock-price metrics declined only 
modestly between 1998 and 2012.205  
While the trend of adopting multiple performance metrics, and specifically, a 
combination of market and accounting-based performance metrics, is consistent with a story of 
                                                 
198 Hay (2013) at 40.   
199 Cook (2014) at 12 (sample includes the 250 largest companies in the S&P 500); Equilar (2014) at 5 (sample 
includes the entire S&P 500). 
200 Cook (2014) at 12 (ISS). 
201 Cook (2014) at 13. 
202 Equilar (2014) at 3. 
203 Hay (2013) at 41. 
204 See BBCK (2013) at Table 2.   
205 See BBCK (2013) at Table 2.   
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firms selecting performance hurdles with an eye towards minimizing reported compensation 
expense, there are other, more benign explanations that may contribute to the observed 
behavior.206 
A distinct advantage to the treatment of plans with accounting-based metrics is that this 
regime results in zero expense recognition when performance conditions are not met (and the 
firm may be suffering generally) and positive expense recognition in situations in which 
conditions are satisfied (and the firm may be prospering).  This matching or earnings smoothing 
may be preferred to the ratable recognition of fair value cost for share price-based performance 
shares regardless of ultimate outcomes.207  Core and Packard test whether firms with greater 
financial reporting concerns disproportionately adopt accounting-based metrics for their 
performance share plans in order to take advantage of this earnings smoothing, but their evidence 
does not support this hypothesis.208 
Core and Packard also test two other hypotheses consistent with an optimal contracting 
explanation for performance share plan design choices – relating to the noisiness of share price 
and non-price metrics and stakeholder pressure – but they find no positive support for their 
hypotheses.209  By contrast, Li and Wang do find evidence consistent with an optimal contracting 
explanation for firms adopting accounting-based performance conditions in long-term incentive 
plans,210 and they argue that firms “combine accounting and stock performance measures to 
provide more balanced long-term incentives to CEOs.”211 
These stories are not mutually exclusive.  Some firms may be selecting performance 
measures consistent solely with optimal contracting predictions while executive pay disclosure 
and/or more general compensation expense management considerations influence others.  It 
would not be surprising to find firms responding to the availability of a perceived more favorable 
accounting treatment.  Survey and other evidence indicates that executives are willing to 
sacrifice shareholder value to achieve favorable accounting results.212  And while causation has 
not been firmly established, it certainly appears in hindsight that the favorable accounting regime 
in the 1990s contributed significantly to the boom in the use of stock option compensation.213   
                                                 
206 I have already mentioned the proxy advisory service thumb on the scale in favor of TSR metrics.  See supra. 
207 John E. Core & Heidi A. Packard, Performance Vesting Conditions and CEO Incentives 5 (working paper, Jan. 6, 
2015). 
208 Core & Packard at 5. 
209 Core & Packard at 23. 
210 Zhi Li & Lingling Wang, Executive Compensation Incentives Contingent on Long-term Accounting Performance 
3 (working paper, Nov. 17, 2014) (finding that firms are more likely to issue accounting-based performance awards 
when the ratio of stock volatility to accounting volatility is large). 
211 Li & Wang at 6. 
212 See, e.g., John R. Graham et al, Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-
Dec. 2006, at 27, 31 (reporting results of a survey of over 400 CFOs indicating that over half of respondents were 
willing to sacrifice shareholder value in order to achieve earnings targets). 
213 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
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To be sure, the gap between the accounting rules applicable to share price-based and 
accounting-based performance plans is less dramatic than the former gap between options and 
restricted stock, but it may be shaping behavior, and this would be unfortunate.  Compensation 
committees should be encouraged to optimize equity incentive plans based on maximizing 
shareholder returns, not minimizing reported compensation expense.   
C.  Tentative Suggestions  
The numerous challenges raised by performance-based equity pay can be divided into 
three general categories – grant date disclosure and valuation, gaming, and accurate 
compensation cost accounting.  One common concern is that investors and regulators may not be 
receiving an accurate picture of compensation cost, but another is that differences in accounting 
treatment or gaming opportunities may drive choices of compensation instruments, resulting only 
randomly, at best, in economically efficient incentive systems.  Thus, uniformity should be a 
goal, as well as accuracy.  This section will offer some tentative suggestions in each area. 
1. Grant Date Valuation and Executive Pay Disclosure 
As we have seen, the grant date valuation and disclosure challenges differ depending on 
whether performance equity awards include market conditions, performance conditions, or both. 
While valuation of market condition awards is difficult, firms are employing models that 
generate a grant date fair value for this class of instruments.  Not all, however, disclose sufficient 
information to allow an analyst to replicate the valuation.  CenturyLink, for example, reports in 
its proxy statement that “the value of performance-based restricted shares [is] based on Monte 
Carlo simulations in accordance with SEC rules.”214  Although a description of material 
assumptions is promised in the notes to financial statements, little additional information is 
provided there.215  We are not given the assumptions regarding the distributions of volatility of 
CenturyLink shares or the S&P 500, interest rates, etc.  Certainly, we are not provided with the 
results of the Monte Carlo simulations, aside from a final point estimate of fair value. It is not 
clear whether the paucity of disclosure reflects weak requirements or non-compliance with more 
stringent requirements, but disclosure of the underlying valuation assumptions would allow 
investors and other observers to judge whether and to what extent firms are minimizing reported 
executive pay levels by making opportunistic assumptions.216  The FASB should revisit the 
disclosure mandates of ASC 718 and make it clear that companies are required to disclose all 
inputs into these models.  The only possible objection would be that firms would be forced to 
disclose proprietary information, but it is hard to see the risk of disclosing, e.g., estimates of 
                                                 
214 CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 53.   
215 CenturyLink (2013 10K) at 109-111. 
216 It is not clear whether the disclosure requirements are insufficient or if firms such as CenturyLink are failing to 
supply required disclosures.  The SEC piggybacks off of FASB disclosure requirements.  SEC Reg. S-K, Item 402.  
FASB requires disclosure of “significant assumptions used … to estimate the fair value … of share based 
compensation awards, including (if applicable)” term, expected share volatility, expected dividends, and risk-free 
rates.  ASC 718-10-50-2(f) (emphasis added).  See Merz, supra note x (finding significant failure among German 
listed firms to provide mandated disclosure of performance-vested stock option valuation assumptions and data). 
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cross-volatility of share prices.  These disclosures would not preclude firms from making 
opportunistic assumptions with respect to model inputs, but transparency should curtail the most 
egregious practices. 
Firms are not currently modeling the impact of accounting-based performance conditions 
on the per share value of awards.  Instead, they report grant date compensation cost based on the 
number of shares probable to vest, with no specific disclosure requirement attached to this 
analysis.  Commentators suggest that this “discretion” is attractive to issuers,217 and BBCK 
report that firms are increasingly adopting accounting-based metrics in performance share plans.  
This accounting/valuation advantage could be addressed in several ways.  First, FASB could 
mandate disclosure of the detailed process through which a firm determines the number of shares 
probable to vest and the assumptions underpinning that analysis.  Of course, companies may be 
concerned that disclosure of assumptions regarding sales, earnings, etc., would jeopardize 
confidential information.  More modestly, FASB could require companies to provide historical 
tabular disclosure of the performance targets that determined grant date executive pay – the most 
probable performance level at the time of grant – and the ultimate performance level achieved.  
Of course, internal and external conditions change over a performance period.  We would not 
expect the target to be hit consistently.  But if a company is regularly achieving maximum 
performance, while basing executive pay disclosures on target or threshold performance, that 
might indicate purposeful under-reporting. 
More aggressively, FASB could extend the market condition method to all plans, 
including plans incorporating accounting-based metrics.  This may not be an ideal response, as 
the result would likely be systematic undervaluation and underreporting of compensation 
expense for all performance share plans arising from opportunistic selection of model inputs.  
And this ignores the inherent difficulty of ex ante valuation of plans incorporating accounting-
based and other non-price, non-market metrics, such as safety targets.218  On the other hand, if 
the problems associated with ex ante valuation of performance-based equity incorporating 
accounting-based performance measures could be overcome, adopting this approach would, in 
theory, level the accounting playing field between conventional stock and options, and 
performance-based equity pay, and, of course, between performance share plans incorporating 
different types of metrics.219 
                                                 
217 BBCK (2013) at 7 (suggesting “flexible” accounting as a reason for shift in favor of accounting metrics); Core & 
Packard at 8-9 (stating that “firms concerned about earnings targets will want the discretion that comes from” 
incorporation of accounting-based metrics). 
218 Although I have divided the world of performance share metrics into market and accounting-based metrics, the 
reality is more complex.  To be sure, most plans involve either or both market and accounting-based metrics, but 
other metrics, such as safety performance, are possible, and ASC 718 more accurately divides the world of 
performance metrics into share price/market based and “other.”  ASC 718-20-20. 
219 I say “in theory” because the concern would remain that firms would have greater discretion to minimize reported 
compensation expense with respect to more complex performance-based equity pay plans than with respect to 
conventional options, and more discretion with respect to options than restricted stock, bonus, and salary. 
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Highly accurate grant date valuation of these complex instruments may not be attainable.  
Instead of or in addition to the forgoing suggestions, the SEC should consider de-emphasizing 
grant date executive pay data.  For example, instead of basing its new pay ratio and pay versus 
performance disclosures on grant date executive compensation data, the SEC could have 
employed a moving average of realized pay.  The realized value of equity pay reflects market 
movements as well as compensation per se, which is why the SEC has focused historically on ex 
ante pay calculations in making various comparisons.  But as uncertainty and gaming 
opportunities increase ex ante, the noisiness of ex post data may become the lesser of two 
evils.220 
2. Gaming 
The gaming potential of awards incorporating performance conditions and market 
conditions are similar.  In both cases, executives’ inside information may be used to 
opportunistically select metrics and, when relative measures are employed, peer group 
membership.  Gaming of performance metrics can be curtailed, but not eliminated.  Investors and 
conscientious directors need to recognize the gaming opportunities and take steps to minimize 
them, or at the very least, to consider the gaming risk in thinking about the tradeoffs.  For 
example, while it might seem more accurate to measure performance relative to that of a small 
group of peer companies, that selection is gameable.221  Relative performance evaluation against 
a broad index, such as the S&P 500, is much less gameable.  There’s a tradeoff.  Similarly, 
revising the selection of performance categories from plan to plan might be an optimal response 
to changes in firm priorities in a dynamic market.  Sales might be the priority for the 2014 plan; 
earnings for the 2015 plan; and cash flow for the 2016 plan.  But every time a firm chooses a 
new performance category or categories, there’s an opportunity for executives with inside 
information to game the selection. 
In order to minimize gaming, ideally executives would be excluded from the process of 
choosing peer groups and performance categories, but that is probably unrealistic.  Performance 
metrics should reflect firm priorities, and the executives are experts on those priorities.  
Nonetheless, like other executive pay decisions in modern corporations, these decisions need to 
be managed closely by independent compensation committees and independent consultants who 
work directly for the independent committees.  All of these people need to be finely attuned to 
the gaming risks. 
                                                 
220 Executive discretion over the timing of stock option exercise also introduces noise into realized pay data, but this 
is not an issue with respect to performance share plans that are typically adopted annually with the same set term 
(most often three years) for each annual plan.  In any event, a moving average of would reduce the noise in annual 
realized pay levels. 
221 Cf Faulkender & Yang, supra note x; Bizjak et al, supra note x (providing evidence of gaming in the selection of 
compensation peer group members). 
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3. Compensation Expense 
As we have seen, the two accounting methods applicable to performance share plans are 
both likely to result in under-reporting of compensation expense, but for different reasons.  For 
typical plans, the performance condition method results in a downward bias in expected 
compensation expense (as well as discretion to minimize grant date executive pay in the proxy 
statement), while the market condition method opens the door for opportunistic selection of 
assumptions that reduce reported and expected compensation expense.  Firms may prefer one of 
these two methods based solely on their accounting preferences, or, as we have seen, firms may 
adopt both by incorporating both types of performance metrics, thereby further minimizing 
expected compensation expense. 
The two approaches are also likely to result in a significant book/tax gap with respect to 
executive pay.  The book/tax gap refers to the difference between the amount of compensation 
expense reported to shareholders (book) and the amount reported to the IRS as deductible 
compensation expense (tax).222  Some commentators and several prominent politicians have 
argued for conforming the book and tax treatment of executive pay as a means of limiting 
gaming of tax deductions (also known as sheltering), expense recognition (also known as 
cooking the books) or both.223  Before the advent of performance-based equity compensation, 
stock options were the primary concern.  A stock option book/tax gap arises because GAAP 
expense is based on a manipulable “fair value” determination at grant, while the tax deduction is 
based on the gain actually realized by an employee on exercise.224  Although market movements 
in the years between grant and exercise can result in dramatic differences between book and tax 
expense recognition for particular options, the only systematic concern is that book expense is 
being minimized through the opportunistic selection of assumptions.  To be clear, to the extent 
that firms use unbiased assumptions in calculating grant date value, except for time value, there 
would be no expected difference between book and tax expense for options.225 
Performance-based equity exacerbates the book/tax gap problem.  As noted above, the 
current GAAP treatment of plans utilizing an accounting-based performance measure will result 
in expected book expense that is systematically less than the expected realized value of the 
instrument.  Since tax is based on realized values, book expense will not just vary randomly from 
tax expense, it will be systematically lower.  Performance plans that utilize only stock price 
measures, such as relative TSR plans, are accounted for just like options.  The concern here is 
that the additional complexity and obscurity of these instruments will make it easier for firms to 
choose valuation assumptions that result in accounting expense that is downward biased.  The 
book/tax concern with options will be magnified for these plans. 
                                                 
222 David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 62 Tax Law Rev. 399, 
400-03 (2009); Celia Whitaker, Bridging the Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680, 684-85 (2005). 
223 Walker & Fleischer, supra, at 400. 
224 Walker & Fleischer, supra, at 403-06. 
225 The fair value of an option as calculated using Black Scholes or other accepted methodologies is the discounted 
present value of the expected value on realization.   
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But there is a solution to the problem of compensation expense dis-uniformity and the 
book/tax gap.  Several years ago, Victor Fleischer and I suggested applying mark-to-market 
accounting treatment to compensatory stock options.226 The idea was to ensure that the aggregate 
compensation expense for options matched the realized value of these instruments and to 
conform the book and tax treatment for options.  An additional advantage to this proposal was 
that it reduced the benefit to firms of undervaluing options ex ante.  A low ex ante valuation 
might reduce the level of executive pay disclosed in the proxy statement, but would not impact 
the ultimate book expense for compensation.  As a result, firms would have less of an incentive 
to manipulate the ex ante value of options and less of an incentive to utilize options in the first 
place, over cash, restricted stock, or other forms of compensation.227  
In my view, the rise of performance shares increases the attractiveness of that suggestion 
and increases the urgency.  Under a mark-to-market approach, firms would estimate fair value at 
grant and begin expense accruals with that valuation.  Firms would update their valuations 
periodically and revise accruals as necessary.  In the case of options and performance share plans 
employing stock price or market metrics only, fair value would be recalculated periodically using 
the same model that firms use today at grant.  In the case of performance share plans employing 
only accounting-based metrics, at the end of each period firms would calculate “fair value” by 
determining the number of shares that are probable to vest and multiplying by the current share 
price, not the share price at the time of the grant.  For performance share plans incorporating 
both market and performance conditions, fair value would be recalculated by model periodically 
reflecting the market condition and at the same time the firm would reassess the number of 
shares that are probable to vest given the accounting-based performance condition.  In all cases, 
the instruments will vest (or not) and aggregate expense recognition would be trued up to the 
transparent value at vesting.  As a result, mark to market accounting reduces the incentive to 
select model inputs opportunistically to minimize valuations because these assumptions only 
impact initial and intermediate expense disclosures, not the ultimate book expense for 
performance-based equity pay.   
This accounting approach is already in existence.  It is the accounting treatment that 
applies to SARs and other “liability awards” under ASC Topic 718, including cash-settled 
performance plans that employ accounting-based metrics.228  In order to ensure a level playing 
field, this mark-to-market approach should apply to all forms of long-term compensation – 
conventional restricted stock, options, and performance-based equity pay, in addition to SARs 
and cash settled performance plans. 
Not only is this approach already in existence, it was the approach applicable to 
performance share grants prior to the issuance of SFAS 123R.229  In other words, I am proposing 
                                                 
226 Walker & Fleischer, supra, at 436-42. 
227 Walker & Fleischer, supra, at 438. 
228 ASC 718-30-35; PWC at 1-44. 
229 Core & Packard at 7. 
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a return to mark-to-market accounting for these instruments, but importantly, also for all forms 
of long-term compensation.230  In my view, this would be the most effective way to level the 
playing field between compensation instruments and ensure that book compensation expense 
reflects reality. 
Some may argue that mark-to-market accounting creates too much uncertainty for issuers 
and too much noise in compensation cost recognition.231  The realized value of a performance 
share award, and the compensation cost recognized under mark-to-market accounting, may far 
exceed the value at grant if the company’s stock price rises precipitously.  This is true, but the 
problem, if it is a problem, could be managed by capping award payouts.  And note that firms do 
not appear to be discouraged from incorporating accounting-based metrics in performance share 
plans, which can result today in significant variability (or noise) in the ultimate compensation 
expense that is booked.232  In fact, some view this feature as a plus as it tends to smooth earnings, 
particularly when the metric is a measure of earnings.233  But variable accounting would also 
tend to smooth earnings; not perfectly, of course, share prices could rise for reasons other than 
strong earnings.  But if earnings and share price are correlated, variable accounting would serve 
an earnings-smoothing function. 
The noise inherent in mark-to-market accounting for equity pay would reduce 
comparability of earnings from firm to firm and over time.  This is an unavoidable downside.  
The question is whether we’ve reached the point in equity pay evolution at which mark-to-
market accounting is the lesser of two evils; whether noisiness in book expense is an acceptable 
price for leveling the playing field between various equity pay instruments, eliminating 
downward biases, and counteracting enhanced manipulability of ex ante valuation.  It’s a 
tradeoff, and the answer is not obvious.  Further analysis must be left to future work.  I am not 
concerned, however, that imposing mark-to-market accounting would kill equity pay or long-
term pay more generally.234  As long as the method is applied consistently to all forms of long-
term compensation, the playing field will be level and firms will be more likely to select 
performance metrics based on their merits.  There may be some modest shift back towards salary 
                                                 
230 Core and Packard note that SFAS 123R made performance-based equity more attractive by eliminating the mark-
to-market or variable accounting requirement.  Core & Packard at 2.  This is no doubt true.  The key to my proposal 
would be to place all long-term compensation on an equal, mark-to-market, footing, eliminating any accounting bias 
between otherwise similar pay arrangements. 
231 Core & Packard at 7. 
232 See supra (describing the increasing use of accounting-based metrics in performance share plans, which results in 
periodic reassessment of the number of shares probable to vest and the corresponding compensation cost).  One can 
think of the performance condition approach as partial mark-to-market accounting.  The number of shares issued is 
updated over time and trued up to actual, but share prices are not. 
233 Core & Packard at 5. 
234 I am also not persuaded by the argument that mark-to-market accounting is undesirable because it includes 
investment returns in recognized compensation cost expense.  See SFAS 123R, para. B46.  First, it is not clear that 
ex ante BSM option valuation (FASB’s preferred method) does not include investment returns.  Aside from time 
value, the real difference seems to be incorporation of expected versus actual investment returns.  It is difficult, 
moreover, to distinguish between investment returns and returns to labor, particularly with respect to senior 
executive equity pay.  But, again, further analysis must be left to future work. 
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and short-term cash bonuses, but the forces lined up in favor of strengthening the link between 
pay and long-term performance, including the proxy advisory services, seem much too strong to 
countenance a significant move away from equity pay.235   
V. Conclusion 
  No executive pay innovation ever seems to provide an unalloyed good, and 
performance-based equity is no exception.  While these instruments provide tremendous 
flexibility and the potential to improve executive incentives – particularly through enhanced 
relative performance evaluation – the complexity of these instruments creates daunting 
challenges for our executive pay disclosure and compensation cost reporting regimes.  The key, 
as always, is to hang onto the baby; to manage the disclosure, accounting, and gaming issues 
while preserving the incentive-enhancing properties of these instruments.  This article has 
offered a few tentative suggestions along those lines, and the hope is that unpacking these 
instruments for a non-technical legal audience will prompt more thought and debate on 
appropriate and helpful regulatory responses to this evolving pay landscape. 
                                                 
235 Some observers have voiced concern that the SEC’s proposed equity pay clawback regulations may cause firms 
to de-emphasize equity compensation in executive pay packages.  See, e.g., Morgan, Lewis & Brockius LLP, SEC 
Proposes Rules Requiring Companies to Adopt, Disclose, and Comply with Clawback Policies on Erroneously 
Awarded Executive Compensation (July 2015) (“issues raised by the proposal are significant enough that companies 
may … consider moving to more fixed compensation, time-based vesting of equity awards” etc.).  In my view, the 
clawback regulations are unlikely to have this effect.  More likely, executive pay will simply increase to offset any 
risk of loss via clawbacks.  See generally, See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rules 
Requiring Companies to Adopt Clawback Policies on Executive Compensation, July 1, 2015, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-136.html. 
